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Gored by a Cornucopia: The Risks to Climate
Change From Laws and Policies That Incentivize
Competitive But Divergent Energy Innovations
Roy Andrew Partain∗
INTRODUCTION
The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) is the leading international regulatory effort to
reduce the threats and hazards from anthropogenic climate change.
The UNFCCC primarily focuses on the means of managing the
overall levels of greenhouse gas emissions released into the
atmosphere and the means of preventing those emissions. Almost
every country in the world has ratified the UNFCCC,1 and almost as
many countries have ratified its Kyoto Protocol.2 As such, most
countries in the world have enacted a variety of domestic regulations
to further the goals of the UNFCCC to control and prevent global
climate change.
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol establish certain policy
goals to coordinate global efforts to reduce the impact of
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. However, concerns have
arisen in the recent decades regarding UNFCCC policy failure;
questions have arisen as to whether certain green policies could
backfire and result in increased greenhouse gas emissions. These
concerns are called green paradoxes.3 Broadly summarized, the
Copyright 2015, by ANDREW PARTAIN.
∗ Assistant Professor of Law, Soongsil University, South Korea.
1. 195 countries have ratified the UNFCCC as of March 24, 2014; contrast
that total against the 193 members of the United Nations. See First steps to a
safer future: Introducing The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change. UNFCCC (Jan. 11, 2015, 7:00 PM), https://unfccc.int/essential
_background/convention/items/6036.php, archived at https://perma.cc/544L2QC3 (last visited Jan. 11, 2015); See also Member States of the United Nations
UN (Jan. 11, 2015, 7:00 PM), http://www.un.org/en/members/, archived at
http://perma.cc/JT8Z-2E2V.
2. 192 nations and regional organizations have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. See
Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, UNFCCC (Jan. 11, 2015, 7:08 PM),
https://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php, archived at
https://perma.cc/D63G-C7RT.
3. A variety of models have found that under specific circumstances, green
paradox results might be obtained. While there are other potential causes of green
paradox phenomena, most of the models rely on nuanced economic models that
assume some sort of policy implementation delay or failure combined with certain
behavioral assumptions on fossil fuel producers. A literature review of green
paradox research is provided at Roy A. Partain, Climate Change, Green Paradox
Models, and International Trade Laws, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE
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concern is that asynchronous implementation of climate change
policies across multiple jurisdictions could be dysfunctional; these
sets of problems were originally known as carbon leakage problems.
A similar concern arose in review of proposed rising carbon taxes;4
under certain circumstances, temporal issues in green climate policy
implementation could lead to increased greenhouse gas emissions.5
The combination of diverse energy policies could lead to
increased energy supplies that, when combined with international
trade laws that notably support primary product exports such as
fossil fuels, could encourage increased emissions of greenhouse
gases. Ergo, if the present legal measures are left as-is, there is a
foreseeable risk that the hazards from anthropogenic climate
change could be worsened by higher levels of emissions, even if
green energy laws were successful in stimulating green energy
innovation.
This article investigates a complementary line of research:
whether naïve implementation of the UNFCCC regulatory goals to
provide innovation in new and renewable energy sources, sans
complementary coordination with other measures to provide
innovations in other energy technologies, could result in increased
greenhouse gas emissions. This article finds that such an
implementation could indeed result in increased greenhouse gas
emissions;6 while some of the measures support innovation in green
energy sources, other legal measures support innovation in fossil
fuels.
Part I analyzes the UNFCCC and its associated agreements
such as the Kyoto Protocol. The analysis presented suggests that
such international conventions created to limit the risks of
anthropogenic climate change do drive innovation in new and

CHANGE AND TRADE LAW (Panagiotis Delimatsis, ed. forthcoming 2015)
[hereinafter Partain, Climate Change]. For a critical review of the mathematical
structures underlying most green paradox models, see also Roy A. Partain, Is a
Green Paradox Spectre Haunting International Climate Change Laws and
Conventions? 33 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1 (2014) [hereinafter Partain, Green
Paradox Spectre].
4. This example was the seminal green paradox example proposed by Sinn.
See Hans-Werner Sinn, Public Policies against Global Warming, 15 INT’L TAX
PUB. FIN. 360, 360 (2008).
5. A rising tax rate is mathematically similar to a delayed higher tax rate and
is thus analog to asynchronous implementation of the climate change policies
across multiple countries. See Partain, Climate Change, supra note 3. See also the
more detailed discussion in Partain, Green Paradox Spectre, supra note 3.
6. Albeit, these results are differentiable from international carbon leakage
or conventional green paradoxes in that the model focuses on the simultaneous
application of divergent legal measures.
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renewable energy supplies. Such innovations are intended to
provide increased volumes of energy supplies at affordable prices
in order to displace carbon-emitting energy supplies, thus
preventing anthropogenic sources of climate risk. However, the
key conclusion is that these legal efforts would increase energy
supplies if successful.
Part II inspects select international agreements and concludes
that these particular agreements sustain or encourage the
development of fossil fuels, including petroleum, coal, and natural
gas. Part III examines the role of energy security laws, i.e., those
laws that support the secure supply of energy resources against
adverse conditions, in driving innovation in energy. Such targets
might include securing petroleum volumes or energy alternatives,
such as nuclear energy. Motives for energy security laws might be to
protect energy prices from market forces or to support militarized
forces. Part III looks to laws of the United States as an example.
Part IV considers the role of various international trade
conventions in supporting market conditions and free competition
conditions. This article will examine the WTO/GATT system of
agreements and reveal their support of open trade and competitive
market conditions. Part V integrates the previous four Parts into a
finding of a potential green paradox event: The combined results of
multiple legal policies to encourage energy innovations could result
in increased energy supplies that would price compete, potentially
resulting in increased greenhouse gas emissions, ergo, a green
paradox. Finally, this article concludes by evaluating the steps that
could be taken to de-bug the scenario.
I.UNFCCC DRIVES INNOVATION IN NEW AND RENEWABLE ENERGY
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol provide the foundation
for modern legal institutions to mitigate, prevent, and reduce the
hazards from anthropogenic climate change. While the Protocol
updates and modifies the UNFCCC, the difference is evolutionary
not revolutionary. It is important to review the two set of documents
separately, however, because Canada and the United States are not
currently parties to the Kyoto Protocol.7 Key among these efforts is
the UNFCCC.8 The UNFCCC provided a broad framework to
7. An additional document, the Doha Amendment, has been proposed but not
widely adopted at the current time. Currently, negotiations are underway to extend
the Kyoto Protocol beyond 2015. See Status of the Doha Amendment, UNFCCC,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_amendment/items/7362.php, archived at
http://perma.cc/X7NR-FW2F (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).
8. The preliminary efforts began much earlier, with the first World Climate
Conference (WCC) having convened in 1979. That meeting ultimately led to the
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establish a global means of coordinating regional and domestic
efforts to curb and mitigate the potential harms of climate change.
While the UNFCCC was a sound start, it lacked economic
incentives and emissions controlling obligations to achieve its climate
change policy goals; the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 was developed to
provide those missing tools.9 The Kyoto Protocol established specific
obligations for its signatories to reach certain emission targets; it also
enabled certain private market methods to coordinate carbon emission
reduction plans across actors and jurisdictions.10 The UNFCCC and
the Kyoto Protocol have continued to evolve through the Marrakesh
Accords of 2001, the 2005 Nairobi Work Program on Adaption, the
2007 Bali Road Map, the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, the 2010
Cancun Agreements, the 2011 Durban Platform for Enhanced Action,
the 2012 Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, and most recently
the 2013 Warsaw Outcomes. Thus, from the initial conference in
1979 to the most recent rounds in Warsaw, the development of
climate change policy and carbon emission controls has taken decades
to develop, yet it remains a framework with very little power to
enforce emission limits.
The UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol provide a framework for
addressing climate change, but domestic enactment of local laws is
required to make the agenda functional. Some countries and
regions have developed elaborate regulatory frameworks to
coordinate with the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocols, while other
nations developed frameworks disconnected from the UNFCCC
and Kyoto Protocols, and still other nations have not made
substantial efforts to mitigate carbon emissions.
There are countries and regional areas that coordinate within the
obligations of the UNFCCC. For instance, the European Union (EU)

formation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which
provides the scientific community with a means to colloborate and present
consensus on scientific findings related to climate change to the United Nations and
its Members.
9. “[T]he Kyoto Protocol is what ‘operationalizes’ the Convention. It commits
industrialized countries to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions based on the principles
of the Convention. The Convention itself only encourages countries to do so.”
Making those first steps count: An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol, UNFCCC
(Jan. 11, 2014, 7:21 PM), https://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol
/items/6034.php, archived at https://perma.cc/UZW8-8627.
10. E.g., see the ‘joint commitments’ under art. 4(1), the ‘clean development
mechanism’ under art. 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, and the ‘coordination of measures’
under art. 13(4)(d). Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/ Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22
(1998).
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and its Member States have created legislation at both the EU and
Member State levels to comply with the UNFCCC. The EU
legislation has become a template for other countries. Similar
enactments have been adopted in both South Korea and Japan. On
the other hand, the United States is among those countries that have
put in place a variety of emission controls without legal reference to
the obligations of the Kyoto Protocol. The United States signed and
ratified the UNFCCC, but it has not done similarly for the Kyoto
Protocol. However, the United States has put into place a wide range
of energy efficiency requirements, emissions controls, and other
public campaigns to reduce the causes of anthropogenic climate
change. Nonetheless, the point is made that the EU methods and the
American methods are materially different in manners that might
impact consumer or producer decisions. Finally, there are those
countries that either have no effective regulations to follow the
guidelines of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol or lack the
enforcement capabilities to ensure the operation of their UNFCCC
compliant regulations.
This patchwork of legal regimes has left carbon emissions and
climate change regulatory development uneven and inconsistent on a
global scale. To further exacerbate potential frustrations, the various
regimes have been enacted with equally disjoint time frames; the laws
were not harmoniously or simultaneously enacted, and nor have they
drifted in unison towards more uniformity.
Thus, while the need for the halting of anthropogenic climate
change is broadly understood, global efforts have lacked both
coordination and consistent enforcement. As such, there are concerns
that certain forms of policy implementation might accidentally enable
greater, not fewer, greenhouse gas emissions.
A. Technology for Climate Change Mitigation
The objective of the UNFCCC is the “stabilization of greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”11
Greenhouse gases are defined by their behavior, as gaseous
constituents of the atmosphere that absorb and re-emit infrared
radiation, regardless of source;12 the only per se greenhouse

11. UNFCCC, Art. 2. While both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol have
extensive language on the support of climate science and scientific monitoring, these
topics do not appear to have substantial bearing on the green paradox concerns, so
they have been omitted from the current review framework.
12. UNFCCC, art. 4. sec. 5.
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mentioned in the UNFCCC is carbon dioxide.13 The Kyoto Protocol
improves on the UNFCCC’s definition of greenhouse gases by
providing a list of per se greenhouse gases: (i) carbon dioxide, (ii)
methane, (iii) nitrous oxide, (iv) hydrofluorocabons, (v)
perfluorocarbons, and (vi) sulphur hexafluoride.14 The Doha
Amendment added nitrogen trifluoride to that listing.15
The UNFCCC requires the Parties to “formulate, implement,
publish, and regularly update . . . programmes containing measures to
mitigate climate change.”16 Those measures are required to focus on
reducing emissions of and providing sinks for greenhouse gases.17
The Kyoto Protocol spelled out specific obligatory mitigation
strategies.18 Parties are to:
i. Enhance energy efficiency;19
ii. Provide for greenhouse gas sinks and carbon
sequestration;20
iii. Research, promote, develop and increase the use of new
and renewable energy sources;21
iv. Reduce the various supports and subsidies that enable
greenhouse gas emissions, such as tax breaks for
crude oil production; and22
v. Limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions including
methane emissions.23
Technological innovations are required to accomplish energy
efficiency goals, the development of greenhouse sinks and carbon
sequestration, and the potential development of new and renewable
energy sources.

13. See “[A]nthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gases . . . ” UNFCCC, art. 4, sec. 2(a).
14. Kyoto Protocol, Annex A. List of Greenhouse Gases, http://unfccc.int/kyoto
_protocol/items/3145.php, archived at http://perma.cc/JTE6-NE42 (last visited Mar.
13, 2015).
15. Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, art. 1, sec. B.
16. UNFCCC, art. 4, sec. 1(b).
17. Id.
18. Kyoto Protocol, art. 2, sec. 1(a).
19. Id. at sec. 1(a)(i).
20. Id. at sec. 1(a)(ii) and (iv).
21. Id. at sec. 1(a)(iv).
22. Id. at sec. 1(a)(v). This concerns the green paradox research directly in that
by reducing the tax credits or deductions available to energy producers the
requirement effectively requires a net increase on carbon-related taxes. Depending
on how those changes are implemented, they could fit well within established areas
of green paradox concerns.
23. Kyoto Protocol, art. 2, sec. 1(a)(vii)−(viii).
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Further, the Kyoto Protocol mandates that certain emission
targets be reached by specific deadlines—an element that is absent
in the UNFCCC.24
B. Technology Transfer
The Parties to the UNFCCC are required to develop, apply, and
transfer the technologies that can enable them to meet the prior
requirements to manage greenhouse gases.25 Developed Parties have
specific historical advantages, and thus have the duty to support
Developing Parties in accomplishing their obligations and the broader
goals of climate change mitigation.26 The Annex II Parties are to
provide financial resources to better enable the Developing Parties
acquire and implement climate change mitigation technologies; this
includes “all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance.”27
Similar requirements are found within the Kyoto Protocol.28
The Kyoto Protocol has several mechanisms to better ensure the
transfer of climate change abatement technologies. The first among
these is the “financial mechanism.”29 The financial mechanism
enables the transfer of funds from Developed Parties to Developing
Parties to finance the acquisition and operation of green technologies.
An example of the financial mechanism is the Green Climate Fund to
be operated from Incheon, South Korea. Second, the Kyoto Protocol
calls for a “clean development mechanism,” which would enable
Developed Parties to engage in green climate projects in a
Developing Party’s jurisdiction and enable both parties to benefit
from the generation of emission accounting rules.30 Finally, the Kyoto
Protocol enables emission account unit trading in order for Parties to
pursue economically efficient pathways of mitigating climate
change.31 Thus, the ultimate diffusion of climate change abetting
24. Id. at art. 3, sec. 1. The targets are to be attained by 2012. The Doha
Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol would extend that timeline to 2020 and deepen
the emission cuts to be achieved. See Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, art. 1,
C, “Article 2, paragraph 1 bis.”
25. UNFCCC, art. 4, sec. 1(c).
26. This is a consistent sustainable development principle applied throughout
both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. See UNFCCC, art. 3, sec. 1 and 2. See
generally UNFCCC, art. 4, sec. 2. See also UNFCCC art. 4, sec. 2(1) (noting that
Developed Countries need to demonstrate that they are taking the lead in mitigating
climate change).
27. UNFCCC, art. 4, sec. 3, 5.
28. See Kyoto Protocol, art. 10.
29. Id. at art. 11, sec. 2.
30. Id. at art. 12.
31. Id. at art. 6.
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technologies is mandated by the Kyoto Protocol and economically
supported by its Parties.
A third mechanism is the “technology mechanism.” At the
Conference of the Parties in Doha, Qatar 2012, Decision 14/CP.18
authorized the implementation and initiation of the Climate
Technology Centre and Network under the United Nations
Environment Programme; this action followed from Decision
1/CP.16.32 Thus, the technology mechanism is now operational.
C. Common but Differentiated Obligations
While all Parties remain obligated to the obligations of the
Convention, Developing Parties are permitted certain differences in
implementation from the Developed Parties. This issue plays a
substantial role in when and how emission targets might be
achieved; indeed, as discussed later in this article, the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has taken a very specific
stand on this issue in particular.
Developing Parties are allowed to set their standards with
reference to the attainment efforts of the Developed Parties.33
Economies in transition are given wider berth.34 A variety of
countries are given pre-emptive understanding to their special needs
and concerns; included on the list are countries that will be
especially harmed by climate change and countries that rely heavily
on revenues from fossil fuels and energy-intensive products.35
Additionally, the Framework Convention recognizes that the Least
Developed Parties will need specific forms of assistance.36
The UNFCCC has approximately 200 Parties, but certain Annex
I and II Parties bear more burdens than other Parties. Annex I Parties
are primarily European countries plus Russia, Japan, the United
States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Annex II is the same
list minus the parties who were formerly a part of the Soviet Union.
Annex II is de facto a list of Developed Parties, who are held
financially responsible for assisting Developing Parties. Annex I
Parties assumed obligations to adopt national policies to mitigate
climate change.37 Additionally, Annex I Parties are also required to
coordinate economic and administrative policies with each other to
32. Conference of the Parties, Report of the Conerence of the Parties on its
eighteenth session, held in Doha from 26 November to 8 December 2012, FCCC
/CP/2012/8/Add.2 (Nov. 26 to Dec. 8, 2012).
33. UNFCCC, art. 4, sec. 7.
34. Id. at sec. 6.
35. Id. at sec. 8. See Sec. 8(h).
36. Id. at sec. 9.
37. Id. at sec. 2(a).
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enable climate change mitigation.38 The rest of the Parties,
especially those Developing Parties, are not explicitly obligated to
specifically pursue the same obligations.
Also, while the Kyoto Protocol calls for “[m]easures to limit
and/or reduce emissions of greenhouse gases,”39 only those counties
listed as Annex B have commitments to specific emission
reductions.40 All other countries merely need to enact measures that in
some form could be said to limit or reduce emissions. In such cases,
legislation to promote new and renewable energy or legislation to
promote energy efficiency might suffice.
D. UNFCCC Requires and Supports Energy Innovation
Thus, the basic policy obligations of the UNFCCC and related
legal efforts can be summarized:
1. To reduce the emission of greenhouse gases by several
means:
a. Energy Efficiency;
b. Enhancements of sinks and reservoirs and carbon
sequestration;
c. Development and promotion of new and renewable
forms of energy;
d. Elimination of supports and subsidies for activities
that enable greenhouse gas emissions; and
e. Prevention of methane venting from various
activities;
2. To provide means, both legal and financial, to ensure all
nations can undertake obligations under the UNFCCC;
3. To provide for broad technology transfer, including
intellectual property; and
4. To provide for the transboundary coordination of the
above efforts.
The role of both technology and innovations in energy
technology to provide the solution is self-evident from the listing.
The necessary energy technologies, and thus the needed alternative
energy supplies, are not yet in hand, so the Convention called for the
support of their development and promotion and the facilitation of
their adoption by all Parties. This was a broad request of scientific

38. Id. at sec. 2(e)(i).
39. Kyoto Protocol, art. 2 , sec. 1(a)(vii).
40. Kyoto Protocol, Annex B. Also, Annex B’s list of countries has seen
some variation of included countries since its enactment.
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resources, financial capabilities, and legal coordination between the
Parties.
While political discourse has not yet solved the issues of reducing
subsidies to carbon fuels and effective reductions in emissions, it is
clear that all Parties otherwise strongly support the development of
green energy technologies.41 Given the commitment of the Parties to
the positive development of the technologies underlying this call, it
would be reasonable to expect green and renewable technologies to
provide more energy supplies in the future.
II. ENERGY TRADE LAWS DRIVE INNOVATION IN ENERGY, MOSTLY
IN FOSSIL FUELS
This section examines two international trade agreements that
encourage, inter alia, innovation in energy technologies. However,
contrary to the intent of the UNFCCC, these legal efforts attempt
to secure the future of petroleum and other fossil fuels. While both
efforts do acknowledge their recognition and support of the
UNFCCC, they remain steadfastly committed to protecting and
promoting the commercial feasibility of carbon-based fuels to
compete alongside renewable energy resources.
The first agreement is the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) that
originally was intended to facilitate the interchange of energy
products and investments between Europe and countries emerging
from a Soviet era. The second agreement is OPEC, the collective of
certain major petroleum producing countries. Both of these
arrangements are primarily, if not exclusively, focused on petroleum
and natural gas. Both of them also require their Contracting Parties
or Member States to provide for research and development to secure
future fossil fuel supplies at competitive prices. As such, both
agreements oblige their members to provide for innovation in fossil
fuel energy technologies to enable continued production, higher
rates of production, and market-competitively priced production.
In short, these agreements call for energy innovations to
provide sustained high levels of production of low-cost fossil fuels
41. While few might doubt the EU’s and its Member States commitments to
renewable energy, others might doubt China or the U.S.; however, such
concerns are largely unmerited. China is the world’s largest consumer of coal,
but it also led investment in carbon-free energy in 2013 by funding $61,300
million in research, develop, and installation. RICHARD J. CAMPBELL, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL41748, CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES – A COMPARISON
OF GREEN ENERGY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES, 1 and 4, respectively (2014). For a
discussion on the U.S.’s efforts to support carbon-free energy technologies, see
infra Part III. Even OPEC has reaffirmed its commitments to supporting the
Conventions goals, see infra Part II.B.3.

2015]

GORED BY A CORNUCOPIA

443

at prices competitive to market alternatives. Should they remain in
effect, it is reasonably foreseeable that petroleum and other fossil
fuels would remain in production at a potentially increasing level
of output and thus sustain the provision of large supplies of
competitively priced fuels for the global market.
A. The Energy Charter Treaty
The ECT was originally drafted to facilitate trade in energy
supplies and services.42 It includes within its definition of “energy
materials and products” items related to nuclear energy, coal power,
various petroleum resources and products, natural gas energy,
electrical energy, and certain forms of charcoal.43 It supports a broad
range of energy activities, including exploration, extraction,
production, refining, storage, transport, distribution and marketing.44
Given this coverage, the whole of upstream, midstream, and
downstream fossil fuels are addressed by the ECT.45
The ECT establishes state sovereignty and that the states have
sovereign rights over the energy resources within their jurisdictions.46
Thus, each state is empowered to decide what areas within its
sovereign control are to be “made available for exploration and
development.”47 They may also determine at what rates their
resources may be depleted or extracted.48 Environmental and other

42. The Energy Charter Treaty [hereinafter ECT] Annex I to the Final Act of
the European Energy Charter Conference, Dec. 17, 1994. See also ECT, at art. 2,
“This Treaty establishes a legal framework in order to promote long-term
cooperation in the energy field . . .” Its membership includes, broadly, European
countries, Eurasian/Post-Soviet countries, Japan, and Australia. Its observers include
Canada, China, the U.S., and others. See Members and Observers, ENERGY
CHARTER, (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=61, archived at
http://perma.cc/ABA8-EB74.
43. ECT, art. 1, sec. 4, which references the Harmonized System of the
Customs Co-operation Council and the Combined Nomenclature of the European
Communities. See the listings at ECT, Annex EM, for a complete listing of the
various energy resources included within the ECT. The nuclear energy options
under Annex EM do not include traditional fusion nuclear energy supplies but
only fissile energy supplies and stocks. See Annex EM, sec. 26.12 and 28.44.
44. ECT, art. 1, sec. 5.
45. However, not to the exclusion of other energy sources, such as nuclear
energy.
46. ECT, art. 18, sec. 1. This recognition is tempered in a subsidiary
requirement, also at sec. 1, that such sovereign rights are subject to the rules of
international law.
47. Id. at sec. 3.
48. Id.
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safety concerns remain similarly within the sovereign control of the
states.49
The ECT sought to “develop an open and competitive market, for
Energy Materials and Products.”50 However, many of the signatory
parties were not members of the World Trade Organization’s General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (WTO/GATT) systems regulating
international trade; therefore, the ECT references the WTO/GATT
agreements as guidelines for its own implementation.51 For instance,
all parties to the ECT may not apply any trade related investment
measures inconsistent with article III or XI of the GATT.52 Each
Contracting Party is required to alleviate market distortions and
barriers to trade.53 Further, transit and transportation of products and
services covered by the ECT are to be governed by the principle of
freedom of transit without distinction to origin, destination, or
ownership.54
The ECT facilitates innovation in fossil fuel energy industries, as
well as in other energy sectors. The transfer of energy technology
between Contracting Parties is to be facilitated.55 Investment in
energy sectors of the Contracting Parties is to be encouraged,56 which
may be facilitated by programs and measures of the Contracting
Parties.57
The ECT provides clarity on how Environmental Impact (EI)
should be addressed by the Contracting Parties.58 EIs are defined to
include any given effect on the environment without particular
reference to beneficial or harmful impacts.59 EI might include such
factors as human health and safety, air, water, and climate impacts; it
may also include a wide range of impacts on socio-economic
conditions.60 Each Contracting Party is obligated to minimize the
range of potential EI in economically efficient manners.61 Such
49. Id.
50. Id. at art. 3.
51. Id. at art. 4 and 5.
52. ECT, art. 5(1).
53. Id. at art. 6.
54. Id. at art. 7.
55. Id. at art. 8.
56. Id. at art. 10, sec. 1.
57. Id. at art. 9.
58. ECT, art. 19.
59. Id. at sec. 3(b).
60. Id. From such a broad perspective on potential EI, the effects of
anthropogenic climate change are reasonably includable as EI.
61. ECT, pt. 4, art. 19, sec. 1. Energy Cycle is defined to be the full set of
activities associated with a given type of energy resource over the complete lifespan of the resource from extraction to final consumption and emissions. ECT,
art. 19, at sec. 3(a).
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measures to minimize impacts should consider areas both within and
without the specific state and consider the whole Energy Cycle of the
relevant energy source.62 Each Contracting Party is to undertake
precautionary measures to prevent or minimize environmental
degradation.63 When uncertainty exists over the interpretation of the
environmental provisions of the ECT, the primary resort should be to
other appropriate international forums a prior to taking ECT-based
environmental disputes to review by the Charter Conference.64
Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this article, the
Contracting Parties have obligations to promote innovation and
adoption of:65
i. Energy efficiency technologies;
ii. Renewable energy resources; and
iii. Promotion of the use of cleaner greenhouse gas emitting
fuels.
Such technologies and energy innovations must be shared;66
furthermore, the Contracting Parties are required to promote and
cooperate in the research, development, and application of those
technologies.67 Finally, the Contracting parties are obligated to
promote public awareness of these new energy technologies.68
Thus, it is clear that the ECT promotes multiple forms of energy
innovations, including fossil fuels and renewable energy sources.
There are specific provisions for losses and expropriations.69
Investments in energy sectors are not to be nationalized, expropriated,
or subjected to measures having similar effects unless four tests are
met.70 First, the only approved purpose for an expropriatory act is one
whose purpose is in the public interest.71 Second, the act of
62. See Energy Charter Treaty, art. 19(1), opened for signature Dec. 17,
1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force April 16, 1998). Such measures to
include the full Energy Cycle should promote market-oriented prices but also
provide for the inclusion of more complete environmental costs from that full
Energy Cycle. See ECT, art. 19, at sec. 1(b).
63. See Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 62.
64. See id. at art.19(2).
65. See id. at art.19(1)(d).
66. See id. at art.19(1)(e).
67. ECT, art.19(1)(g).
68. See id. at art.19(1)(f).
69. See id. at arts. 12 and 13.
70. See id. at art. 13(1).
71. See id. at art.13(1)(a). Measures undertaken to limit anthropogenic climate
change might reasonably be construed as in the public interest, so a reasonable
reader might wonder if climate change policies that limited property rights or
infringed on free trade principles might be accepted hereunder as in the “public
interest.” While art. 11 is safe from the application of art. 24, it is of note that art.
24, generally speaking, allows for any Contracting Party to preclude application of
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expropriation may not be discriminatory in character.72 Third, any act
of expropriation must be conducted under due process of law.73
Finally, any such act must be accompanied by the payment of prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation; such compensation must be for
the fair market value of the asset.74
Thus, the ECT provides for the on-going research, development
and investment into energy technologies across a spectrum of energy
alternatives, but it primarily attempts to provide a legal framework to
integrate the energy markets of the Contracting Parties. As such, the
primary energy innovations would be in the fossil fuels and nuclear
energy sectors.
B. Conventions of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries
Five countries established OPEC in 1960: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia and Venezuela.75 Presently, it has one dozen members,
including Qatar, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Nigeria,
Ecuador, Gabon, and Angola.76
1. The OPEC Statute
OPEC is primarily governed by the OPEC Statute.77 The
“principal aim of the Organization shall be the coordination and
unification of the petroleum policies of the Member Countries.”78
Further, the Statute requires OPEC to determine the best means to
protect the Member Countries’ individual and collective interests.79

any section of the ECT if a Contracting Party deems it “necessary to prtoect
human, animal, or plant life or health.” Id. art. 24(b)(i). Thus, if climate change
were found to cause such forms of harm, then it could well be deemed necessary
to limit application of the ECT under 24-2(b)(i) or under 13-1(a).
72. ECT, art. 13(1)(b). If climate change measures were to be introduced in
alignment with the ECT, then such measures would need to also be nondiscriminatory, even if otherwise allowable as a form of expropriation. Similarly,
see id. at art. 24(2), for limits on disguised restriction or certain forms of trade
discrimination.
73. Id. at art. 13(1)(c).
74. Id. at art. 13(1)(d).
75. Member Countries, ORG. OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (Jan.
10, 2015), http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm, archived at http:
//perma.cc/BM69-S73H.
76. Id.
77. OPEC Statute, art. 1, Jan. 1961, 443 U.N.T.S. 247.
78. Id. art. 2(A).
79. Id.
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Thus, OPEC has an active duty to provide for the coordinated
planning of the interests of oil exporting countries.
A Member State can be either one of the original five founder
countries or any other country that possesses a “substantial net
export of crude petroleum” and is otherwise well aligned with the
pre-existing members of OPEC.80 If a country has net exports of
petroleum, but not ‘substantial net exports,’ then it is entitled to join
OPEC as an Associate Member but not as a Full Member.81 This
means that the voting membership of OPEC is limited to countries
that are substantial net exporters of petroleum.82
One of the Organization’s primary goals is to ensure the
economic viability of petroleum products and investments. OPEC is
required to stabilize prices for petroleum products and to eliminate
price fluctuations to promote petroleum’s role in international
markets.83 Further, the Organization is tasked with securing steady
income for its Member Countries, securing efficient, economic, and
regular petroleum supplies for consuming nations, and securing fair
returns on investments in the petroleum industry.84 The Organization
is overseen by a Secretary General who must meet certain
prerequisites for service, including a minimum of a decade in the “oil
industry,” while ministry service or oversight of international business
operations are seen as preferable.85 These requirements have not been
amended since the original enactment of the Statute.86
The Secretary General of OPEC is assisted in his duties by the
Division of Research.87 The Division of Research is required to
research, forecast, and monitor the petro-energy and petro-chemical
industries for hydrocarbons and derived products, including nonenergy products.88 The Division of Research is also tasked with
maintaining research on economic and financial factors associated

80. See id. at art. 7(A)–(C).
81. See id. at art. 7(D).
82. Indonesia was once a Full Member, but it has not only lost its Full
Member status it has also lost Associate Member status as well due to its change
from a net-exporter to a net-importer of petroleum. It terminated its membership
in 2009. See Member Countries, supra note 75.
83. See OPEC Statute, supra note 77, at art. 2(B).
84. See id. at art. 2(C).
85. Id. at art. 28(A)(c).
86. See generally OPEC Statute, ORG. OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING
COUNTRIES (Jan. 10, 2015), http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/publications/345
.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/NHK9-QJ6B. See also OPEC Statue, supra note
77, at Amendments to the Statue.
87. OPEC Statute, supra note 77, at art. 32(A).
88. See id. at art. 33(A)(2).
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with the above industries and products.89 The Division has a duty to
advance data sharing across Member Countries.90
Similarly, the Secretary General is assisted by the Division of
Support Services.91 One of the Division’s duties is to keep the
Secretary General abreast of policy changes in the international
petroleum industry, which could affect OPEC or its Member
Countries.92 Further, when OPEC’s own resources are insufficient to
fulfill the above duties, the Secretary General is to commission
consultants as necessary.93
2. OPEC Solemn Declaration II of 2000
OPEC may convene Summits to bring together the collected
heads of state of the Member Countries to further refine and clarify
the policies and agendas of the Organization.94 There have been
three such Summits: in 1975, in 2000, and in 2007.95 The second
Summit of 2000 was convened against the backdrop of global
negotiations on climate change.96 The third Summit was drawn to
support and re-affirm the centrality of natural resources and the
sovereign rights of the Member Countries to govern their own
resources.97 The Solemn Declarations are the work products of those
Summits; they enhance but do not amend the OPEC Statute.98
The Solemn Declaration II is a brief but dense four-page
document containing 20 resolutions.99 The Declaration charges
OPEC to continue to preserve and enhance the role of crude oil and
natural gas in world energy markets. It calls for a cessation in
efforts to discriminate against petroleum products and for the
reduction of petroleum or carbon taxes that cause similar trade
89. See id. at art. 33(A)(3).
90. See id. at art. 33(A)(4).
91. See id. at art. 32(A).
92. Id. at art. 33(B)(3).
93. OPEC Statute, supra note 77, at art. 34(A).
94. See Solemn Declarations, ORG. OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES
1 (2009), http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/
publications/Solemn_Declaration_I-III.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/38WG9LEK.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See Solemn Declaration II. The Second Summit of Heads of State and
Government of OPEC Member Countries, ORG. OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING
COUNTRIES, 13 (2009), http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media
/downloads/publications/Solemn_Declaration_I-III.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc
/BDY3-7Q45 [hereinafter Solemn Declaration II].
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effects. It also delimits OPEC’s support of the UNFCCC’s goals; it
starkly confronts the global community to recognize poverty and
not climate change as the premier environmental tragedy. As such,
the Declaration supports the expansion of petroleum consumption
as a means to end global poverty; OPEC is to remain on path to
provide technological innovations to ensure the supply and
affordability of petroleum products and industries.
The Declaration reaffirms the role of OPEC to preserve and
enhance the “role oil would play in meeting future energy
demand.”100 OPEC has a duty to steward and optimize the economic
value recoverable from the Member Countries petroleum assets.101 In
particular, OPEC is to protect the OPEC Member Countries’ share of
petroleum revenues vis-à-vis other oil exporting countries.102
OPEC has a duty to ensure that petroleum products remain
remunerative for its owners and investors, stable in supply, and
competitive with other energy sources for consumers.103 Additionally,
the Solemn Declaration II calls for increased consumption of crude oil
and natural gas when “other fuels are recognized as being damaging
to the global environment.”104 The Declaration calls on consuming
countries to prevent discrimination against crude oil consumption,
stating that they should “adopt fair and equitable treatment of oil in
world energy markets.”105 Key among those forms of discrimination
are differing forms of petroleum taxes and potential carbon taxes; the
Declaration calls these taxes a burden that prevents just and equitable
terms of trade.106
The Solemn Declaration II delimits OPEC support of the
UNFCCC. It does recognize and support OPEC’s engagement with
the UNFCCC, but it requires special attention to two policies that
would limit the overall impact on petroleum producers and certain
potential petroleum consumers.107 First, the UNFCCC should be
guided by recognition of the “principle of common but differentiated
responsibility,” that not all countries should face identical
consequences for industrialization and resultant carbon emissions as
100. Id. at RESOL. 1.
101. See id. at RESOL. 2.
102. See id. at RESOL. 4.
103. See id.
104. Id. at RESOL. 11. The Declaration does not explicitly state what kinds of
fuels these might be, but one might reasonably assume that fuels based in fission
nuclear technologies, as seen at Chernobyl or Fukushima, might be such fuels.
Additionally, concerns that ecological disturbances might be caused by wind
turbines or by wave turbines could similarly be classified in this manner.
105. Solemn Declaration II, supra note 99, at RESOL. 14.
106. See id. at RESOL. 15.
107. See id. at RESOL. 10.
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many countries have not yet benefitted from such industrialization
and did not yet emit such volumes of greenhouse gases.108
Additionally, the Declaration urges the countries listed in Annex I of
the UNFCCC to promote measures to minimize the adverse social
and economic impacts that would occur to countries whose
economies are highly dependent on the production and export of
fossil fuels.109
Additionally, the Declaration warns that OPEC will retain the
eradication of poverty, not climate change, as its premier target for
economic and social development and sustainability.110 In fact, the
Declaration explicitly challenges the Annex I nations to “recognize
that the premier environmental tragedy facing the globe is human
poverty,” and not anthropogenic climate change.111 It states that
OPEC will continue to engage in the UNFCCC processes but that
OPEC will also continue its advocacy on poverty issues within
other UN forums.112
3. OPEC Solemn Declaration III of 2007
The Solemn Declaration III113 follows and extends the principles
of the previous Declaration by developing three themes: stability of
energy markets, energy for sustainable development, and energy and
the environment.114
Under the theme of stability for energy markets, the Declaration
promotes increases in investment in both upstream and downstream
capacities to enable greater supplies of petroleum to reach the
market.115 The instability of petroleum supplies, petroleum demand,
and short-term energy prices are to be improved for the benefit of
108. Id.
109. See id. at RESOL. 11. Broadly speaking, those countries are highly
correlated to the membership listing of the G-20; they include the Member States of
the EU and the EU itself, the Russian Federation, Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
the U.S., Japan, and other countries in or very close to Europe. See List of Annex I
Parties to the Convention, UNITED NATIONS, http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers
/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php, archived at http://perma.cc/K6R3-7LUG (last
visited Jan. 25, 2015).
110. Solemn Declaration II, supra note 99, at RESOL. 12.
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. Solemn Declaration III. Conference of Sovereigns and Heads of State of
OPEC Member Countries. Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, ORG. OF THE PETROLEUM
EXPORTING COUNTRIES, 17 (2009), http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files
_project/media/downloads/publications/Solemn_Declaration_I-III.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/BDY3-7Q45. [hereinafter Solemn Declaration III].
114. Id. at 17.
115. See id. at 18, RESOL. 5.
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both producers and consumers.116 The roles of both technology and
innovation in efficiency and sustainability of petroleum production
are to be promoted.117 Finally, the Declaration calls for the adoption
of transparent, non-discriminatory, and predictable trade, fiscal,
environmental, and energy policies to better enable free trade access
to markets. Clearly, this section expects petroleum production to be
sustained and expanded upon by support from technology and
innovation and rewarded with access to markets without limits
posed by environmental or trade barriers.
Within the topic of energy for sustainable development, the
Declaration reasserts that the eradication of poverty should be the
“first and overriding global priority.”118 Developed countries are
urged to promote the diffusion of technology, especially
environmentally friendly technologies, to developing countries.119
The Declaration announces a plan to eradicate what it refers to as
“energy poverty” in the developing world.120 As a part of that plan,
OPEC is called to develop financial tools and measures to ensure that
financial cooperation among OPEC members enables those
developing countries to obtain the energy products they need.121
Under its discussion on energy and environment, the Declaration
calls for OPEC to provide “clean, affordable and competitive
petroleum resources for global prosperity.”122 It calls for costeffective measures to address global environmental problems.123 It
calls for the support of forests and reforestation as a means to sink
greenhouse gases.124
Yet, the discussion re-addresses the “common but differentiated”
paradigm of the previous Declaration.125 Within the same set of
resolutions, it calls for the OPEC countries to promote innovation in
petroleum technology with the “objective of increasing the petroleum
116. See id. at RESOL. 6 and 7.
117. See id. at RESOL. 8.
118. Id. Energy for Sustainable Development, RESOL. 1. In contrast to climate
change or other agendas, one might reasonably assume is the intended ranking
preference.
119. Solemn Declaration III, supra note 113, at RESOL. 4.
120. Id. at RESOL. 6.
121. See id. at RESOL. 7.
122. Id. at 21.
123. See id. at RESOL. 1.
124. Id. at RESOL. 3. Obviously the primary intent here is to reabsorb released
carbon dioxide, as forests are not particulary suited to reabsorb methane or other
greenhouse gases.
125. Solemn Declaration III, supra note 113, at RESOL. 4. Per se the resolution
addresses the UNFCCC to suggest that while OPEC and its Member Countries
endorse the UNFCCC and its apirations, they distinguish between the duties and
obligations of developed and developing economies.
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resource base.”126 It also calls for technological innovations to reduce
the costs of production.127 The Declaration calls for policies based on
the UNFCCC to take into account the special needs of countries
heavily dependent on the production and export of fossil fuels.128
Finally, the declaration calls for two fields of technological
innovation: (i) the transformation of petroleum products into clean
energy products and (ii) the development of technologies that address
climate change.129
III. ENERGY SECURITY POLICY LAWS DRIVE INNOVATION IN
ENERGY, ALL DIRECTIONS
The United States supports innovations in energy resources
through multiple measures and toolsets. While the United States is
not the only nation to seek energy security, it is perhaps both the
largest and most obvious example. The Department of Energy
(DOE) is charged with leading civilian efforts and the Department
of Defense (DOD) with the military efforts; however, both
Departments are dwarfed in spending and are influenced by the
effect of tax policies embedded within the United States’ federal
income tax code. But the United States’ overall policy is to pursue
all directions at once: green energy, conventional hydrocarbons, and
innovative nuclear technology are all encouraged by the DOE, the
DOD, and by the Internal Revenue Code. The following subsections
provide a review of all three approaches to demonstrate that the
promotion of energy security provides for innovations and future
production of both fossil fuel resources and renewable energy
resources.
A. Federal Research Programs
The United States maintains extensive support for the research
and development of energy innovations. This support can be
compared in terms of scale to the research programs that supported
the development of the atomic bomb and the Apollo moon
landings.130 Whereas the Manhattan Project spent $22 billion over
five years and the greater NASA/Apollo program spent $98 billion
126. Id. at RESOL. 2.
127. Id.
128. Id. at RESOL. 5. The Declaration suggests that a balanced agenda is needed
bewteen those nations emitting greenhouse gases and those in earlier stages of
economic development.
129. Id. at RESOL. 7. However, the example of such a climate change technology
is carbon capture and sequestration and not a new or renewable energy source.
130. Id. en passim.
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over 14 years, the broader federal energy innovation projects spent
more than $118 billion over 35 years prior to 2009; the annual
rates of expenditure for energy innovation fell between the annual
expenditures for the previous two programs.131
However, the United States has supported energy innovation for
longer than suggested by the above narrative. Arguably, the Hoover
Dam Project and the Manhattan Project were energy research
projects in that they provided new forms or scales of energy
production.132 Nonetheless, earnest energy innovation support began
under the shadow of the 1970s oil supply shocks.133 This support
occurred in two steps. First, the United States government increased
coordination on energy innovation oversight by coalescing multiple
energy research groups into the Energy Research and Development
Administration (ERDA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC).134 A second focusing of energy innovation efforts resulted
in the creation of the DOE by merging the ERDA with 50 other
energy offices and programs across the federal government.135In the
first five years of those focused efforts to drive energy innovations,
the federal government spent over $40 billion.136
The DOE has faced declining budgetary support from Congress in
recent years; it received $10 billion in 1980 but only $3.4 billion in
2012.137 Most of the DOE’s research funding is driven to direct
investment in research and development of energy innovations; its
capacity for loans and loan guarantees has been effectively defunded
by Congress.138 The DOE supports research programs in fossil fuels,
nuclear energy, energy efficiency, and renewable energy sources.139
Approximately 27% of the DOE’s research budget is allocated to
131. Solemn Declaration III, supra note 113, at 6; see also Table I.
132. The Hoover Dam began as a federally funded development with the
Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1928). The Manhattan Project was
supported by the issuance of Exec. Order No. 8807, 3 CFR 3207 (1941), which
created the Office of Scientific Research and Development, a war-time predecessor
to today’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
133. DEBORAH D. STINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34645, THE MANHATTAN
PROJECT, THE APOLLO PROGRAM, AND FEDERAL ENERGY TECHNOLOGY R&D
PROGRAMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 3 (2009).
134. Id. The legislative measure was the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974
(P.L. 93-438).
135. Id. The legislative measure was the Department of Energy Organization
Act of 1977 (P.L. 95-91).
136. Id. at 6 (taking note particularly of Table I).
137. In annualized 2011 dollars. Terry Dinan & Philip Webre, CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, Federal Financial Support for the Development and Production of Fuels
and Energy Technologies 1, 5 (Mar. 2012), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files
/03-12-EnergyTechnologies.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc /SPY6-8RM3.
138. Id. at 5 and 6.
139. Id. at 5.
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renewable energy sources and another 27% is allocated to energy
efficiency research.140 Twenty-three percent of its funds are allocated
to nuclear research.141 Ten percent is aimed at fossil fuel research
programs; primarily, programs that reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.142 The remainder is mostly spent on electrical delivery and
reliability research.143
B. United States Department of Defense and Energy Innovations
While the DOE is the lead executive branch department tasked
with stewarding energy innovations, the DOD actually spends more
on energy products than any other section of the federal
government, thus its policies and measures to impact energy
innovation are noteworthy.144 Reportedly, the DOD might be the
world’s largest energy consumer.145 In 2010, the DOD’s energy
consumption represented 80% of the energy consumed by the
federal government; it consumed an estimated 880 trillion BTUs
that year.146 It is also important to note that the legal aspects of these
measures are primarily driven by budget requests and their
integration in the budgetary measures approved by Congress.
The Defense Production Act provides authority for the DOD and
its military branches to engage in support of energy technologies and
resources.147 First and foremost, energy is central to the Act’s concept
of “national defense:” “[t]he term ‘national defense’ means programs
for military and energy production or construction, military or critical

140. Id. at 7.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Dinan & Webre, supra note 137, at 7.
144. Moshe Schwartz, et al., Department of Defense Energy Initiatives:
Background and Issues for Congress, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (Dec. 10, 2012),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42558.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/LS98JX2D (2012). For a recent article on the U.S. military’s climate change measures and
responsive planning see Sarah E. Light, The Military-Environmental Complex, 55
B.C. L. REV. 879 (2014). E.g., In the United States, its military is the largest
consumer of energy products and services, and thus its internal planning with
regards to energy products and services would have spill-over impact on the United
States’ broader efforts to mitigate climate change.
145. Schwartz, et. al, supra note 144, at 1.
146. Id. at 2. Reporting that after the DOD’s 80% share of energy, the next
largest user of energy was the postal service which used only four percent of the
energy budget. The obvious disparity of the DOD’s role on energy planning is
stunning yet not generally recognized by the general public.
147. The Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, is enacted at 50 U.S.C.
App. § 2061 (2012).
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infrastructure assistance to any foreign nation, homeland security,
stockpiling, space, and any directly related activity.”148
The Act establishes that the “security of the United States is
dependent on the ability of the domestic industrial base to supply
materials and services for the national defense and to prepare for and
respond to military conflicts, natural or man-caused disasters, or acts
of terrorism within the United States,” and that “in order to ensure
national defense preparedness, it is necessary and appropriate to
assure the availability of domestic energy supplies for national
defense needs[.]”149 The Act requires that “to the maximum extent
possible, domestic energy supplies should be augmented through
reliance on renewable energy sources (including solar, geothermal,
wind, and biomass sources), more efficient energy storage and
distribution technologies, and energy conservation measures . . . .”150
The DOD and the President of the United States are granted
broad powers to economically support and encourage industrial
activities under the Act; purchase orders, federal loans, and federally
backed loan guarantees are all made available. First, the DOD can
move to provide industrial support via directed purchases, enabling
private producers to obtain independent financing given secured
sales or delivery contracts:151
To create, maintain, protect, expand, or restore domestic
industrial base capabilities essential for the national
defense, the President may make provision—
(A) for purchases of or commitments to purchase an industrial
resource or a critical technology item, for Government use or
resale;
(B) for the encouragement of exploration, development, and
mining of critical and strategic materials, and other materials;
(C) for the development of production capabilities; and
(D) for the increased use of emerging technologies in
security program applications and the rapid transition of
emerging technologies—
(i)from Government-sponsored research and development
to commercial applications; and
(ii) from commercial research and development to
national defense applications.152
148. 50 U.S.C. § 2152(14) (emphasis added).
149. Id. at § 2062(a)(1) and (a)(5) (emphasis added). See also id. at § 2076,
“[f]or purposes of this Act, ‘energy’ shall be designated as a ‘strategic and
critical material[.]’”.
150. Id. at § 2062(a)(6) (emphasis added).
151. Id. at § 2093(a)(1).
152. Id. (emphasis added).
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Second, energy resource providers can receive direct federal loans
when necessary:
[T]he President may make provision for loans to private
business enterprises (including nonprofit research
corporations and providers of critical infrastructure) for the
creation, maintenance, expansion, protection, or restoration of
capacity, the development of technological processes, or the
production of essential materials, including the exploration,
development, and mining of strategic and critical metals and
minerals.153
Third, if the commercial producers need financial support to achieve
production targets
the President may authorize a guaranteeing agency to provide
guarantees of loans by private institutions for the purpose of
financing any contractor, subcontractor, provider of critical
infrastructure, or other person in support of production
capabilities or supplies that are deemed by the guaranteeing
agency to be necessary to create, maintain, expedite, expand,
protect, or restore production and deliveries or services
essential to the national defense.154
When the United States provides support “to correct a domestic
industrial base shortfall, the President should give consideration to
the creation or maintenance of production sources that will remain
economically viable after such assistance has ended . . . .”155 Thus,
to the extent that DOD measures under the Act call for additional
energy innovations, priority must be given to those technologies that
would be economically feasible after establishment under the Act.
There are limits to the powers to provide economic incentives and
supports for energy innovation under the Defense Production Act,
but most of them are waived during periods of declared national
emergency. Because the United States is currently in multiple states
of declared emergency, those limits may not apply.156 Thus the
DOD, via the Defense Production Act, has extensive capacities to
encourage and foster energy innovations outside of the civilian
efforts at the DOE.
153. 50 U.S.C. § 2092(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
154. Id. at § 2091(a)(1).
155. Id. at § 2062(b)(4) (emphasis added).
156. There are currently over two-score officially decalred national states of
emergency extent, see Patrick Thronson, Toward Comprehensive Reform of
America’s Emergency Law Regime, 46(2) U. Mich. J. L. Reform 737, 754, at Table I
(2013).
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The primary fuels consumed by the DOD are products derived
from petroleum.157 The vast majority of that fuel is used to power
aircraft.158 This reliance on liquid fossil fuels is complicated by the
fact that the DOD maintains fleets of aircraft and vessels that are
expected to remain in service for long-term periods, so while the
source of that liquid energy might be novel, e.g., green bio-diesel,
the need to combust that fuel in the in-place mechanical assets such
as boat engines or jet engines will remain the same.159 Thus, the
DOD financially supports innovations in alternative liquid fuel
sources. The United States Air Force (USAF) undertook obligations
to acquire 50% of its domestic aviation fuels from alternative fuel
blends by 2016.160 Also notable in the USAF’s approach is their
apparent intent to drive the innovation by market demand, i.e., their
procurement processes will be mandated to obtain such fuels instead
of providing pre-market subsidies. This is best reflected in two
elements: first, the USAF’s primary expenditures on alternative
fuels are to upgrade its engine assets to match new fuel blends,161
and second, the USAF has pre-established a certification program to
approve alternative fuels from bio-fuels, alcohol-derived aviation
fuels, and Fischer-Tropsch-transformed natural gas stocks of
aviation fuel.162
The United States Navy (USN) and the United States Marine
Corps (USMC) have announced their goals to “lead the Nation in
sustainable energy.”163 “[The Department of the Navy] will be
protecting the environment with clean energy and lessening our
dependence on foreign oil,” by increasing reliance on alternative
fuels, bio-fuels, solar energy systems and geothermal energy
systems.164 By 2016, they intend to develop and deploy a “Green
157. Schwartz, supra note 144, at 2.
158. Id. at 3–4. The USAF consumes 53% of the DOD’s energy budget and
90% of that is spent on aviation fuels. The USN similarly maintains flight lines
in addition to boats; the Navy consumes 28% of the DOD’s energy budget and
54% of their energy needs are met by petroleum derived fuels. The United States
Army relies on the USAF and USN to provide the bulk of its heavy lift and
transportation needs, so the Army requires less energy overall; it consumes only
about 18% of the DOD’s energy budget.
159. Id. at 15.
160. Id. at 16 (citing to a U.S. Air Force Briefing, “Air Force Energy
Consumption,” Mar. 6, 2012. The primary target is a 50:50 blend of traditional
petroleum sources and non-petroleum-based fuels.).
161. Id. at 17. Over $800 million in funding over the 2013-2017 fiscal years.
162. Id. The Fischer-Tropsch transformation enables natural gas, or other
sources of hydrogen, to be converted into a liquid hydrocarbon; it is industrially
known as the “gas-to-liquids” process (GTL).
163. Schwartz, supra note 144, at 18 (citing to Highlights of the Department
of Navy FY 2013 Budget, DEP’T OF THE NAVY, Feb. 2012, at 1–8).
164. Id. at 18.

458

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. 3

Strike Group,” a cluster of ocean vessels and aircraft powered
exclusively by biofuels, as a demonstration of the potential of
biofuels.165 They plan to ensure that 50% of USN and USMC fuel
needs could be met with biofuels by 2020 by financially supporting
innovations in biofuels, alongside the Departments of Agriculture
and DOE, with over $500 million in committed funds.166
The net result of the DOD’s powers to support innovation in
energy sources, combined with its focus on replacing petroleumderived aviation fuels, is that both additional capacity in alternative
liquid fuels will be created at the same time that large quantities of
petroleum-based fuels will no longer be consumed, thus the market
will likely have increased quantities of both petroleum-derived and
non-petroleum-based liquid fuels available for purchase.
C. Federal Income Tax Incentives
The oil and gas sector has long received certain tax treatments
from the United States Tax Code that are either obvious incentives
for additional volumes of production, obvious incentives for
technological enhancements that maintain the competitive cost
structure of oil and gas investments, or are suspected incentives for
increased levels of production, such as the depletion allowance.
More recently, in 2006, the tax code added tax credits and other
incentives for new and renewable energy sources.167
Combined, these tax incentives strongly facilitate energy
innovations and aid in their commercial feasibility. The combined
annual value of the tax code-driven incentives have been estimated at
$20 billion, dwarfing the DOE’s $3.5 billion in annual supports for
the same targets.168 As such, the tax code incentives represent the
lion’s share of the federal government’s efforts to encourage energy
innovation.
While support for energy has long been an area of focus within
the tax code, it does not suggest that tax policy makers have slowed
down their legislative efforts to provide for energy innovation
supports. In the last decade, there have been 11 major enactments
that addressed energy policy via tax code incentives.169 Thus, the tax
code remains a hot area of energy policy efforts.
165. Id. (citing to USN, The Department of the Navy’s Energy Goals, available
at http://www.navy.mil/features/Navy_EnergySecurity.pdf, archived at http://perma
.cc/VV9S-HUS4).
166. Id.
167. Dinan & Webre, supra note 137, at 1.
168. Id.
169. Sherlock provided a detailed listing and account of the various measures
adopted during the 108th, 109th, 110th, 111th, and 112th Congresses. MOLLY F.
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1. Tax Incentives for Hydrocarbon Energy Production
Reportedly, tax credits and deductions have provided $470 billion
in benefits to petroleum producers since the United States’ federal
income system began. 170 That estimate includes the forecasted $4.8
billion in annual benefits in recent years. 171 The scale of these
benefits has led to calls for their repeal, including President Obama’s
recent budget proposal for fiscal year 2014.172 Repeal of these tax
incentives has been estimated to potentially provide $3.1 billion to
$4.3 billion a year in additional tax revenues.173
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provides a range of tax credits
uniquely applicable to oil and gas producers.174 IRC § 43 provides
tax credits for costs associated with enhanced oil recovery (EOR)
methods; EOR methods are used to produce oil from fields where
primary production has peaked and begun to decline. Primary
production for oil wells is gravity driven and requires little beyond
the well and pumps to extract crude oil from the well. EOR
techniques enable enhanced recovery and rely on chemical
injectants, gaseous pressure-injections, steam, and other means of
heat injections into the well bed to stimulate additional production
levels. Previously, this credit package sustained production when oil
prices were low, but under current pricing levels, the credit is not
available. A similar story can be told for IRC § 45(I), wherein wells
with substantially low volumes of production were encouraged to
remain in production; current pricing prevents the credit from being
applicable.175 The credits would otherwise be $3 per barrel of crude
oil or per 1000 standard cubic feet (scf) of natural gas.176
IRC § 45(K) allows for a nonconventional source production
credit for qualified fuels; the credit is set at $3 per barrel-of-oil

SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL43206, ENERGY TAX POLICY: ISSUES IN
THE 113TH CONGRESS, APPENDIX (2013).
170. Andy Kroll, et al., Triumph of the Drill: How Big Oil Clings to Billions in
Government Giveaways, MOTHER JONES, (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.motherjones
.com/print/249086, archived at http://perma.cc/D8AC-3MHX.
171. Id.
172. ROBERT PIROG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL42374, OIL AND NATURAL
GAS INDUSTRY TAX ISSUES IN THE FY2014 BUDGET PROPOSAL 1 (2013).
173. Id. at 1.
174. The I.R.C. is enacted as the 26th volume of the United States Code, thus
a citation to I.R.C. § 43 is identical to a citation to 26 U.S.C. § 43.
175. I.R.C. § 45I(a).
176. Id. at § 45I(b)(1)(A), (B). “Scf” is the industry standard reference for
standard cubic feet, implying certain air pressure and temperature conditions.
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equivalent.177 Qualified fuels include oil produced from shale and
tar sands, gas produced from geo-pressured brine, Devonian shale,
coal seams, a tight formation, or from biomass, and liquid, gaseous,
or solid synthetic fuels produced from coal (including lignite).178
IRC § 45Q(a)(2) provides tax credits for carbon capture and
storage (CCS) facilities that are affiliated with oil and gas production
activities.179 The carbon dioxide sequestration credit is $10 per metric
ton of qualified carbon dioxide, which is captured by the taxpayer at a
qualified facility and disposed of by the taxpayer in secure geological
storage.180 The oil and gas production activities need to qualify under
the same qualifications as the EOR tax credits.181
IRC § 907 provides tax credits for taxes paid on combined foreign
oil and gas income derived outside of the United States.182 Such
income is recognized as the sum of both incomes related to oil and
gas extraction and to other processing, marketing, and distribution
incomes derived from oil and gas activities.183 It is estimated that this
allowance returns over $1 billion a year to petroleum producers.184
There are also a variety of unique income tax deductions allowed
for fossil fuel producers. IRC § 167(h) enables the geological and
geophysical costs of oil and gas exploration and development to be
depreciated on a quicker time schedule than the ordinary rules.185 It is
estimated that this allowance returns $612 million to $1.1 billion a
year to petroleum producers.186
177. Id. at § 45K(a)(1), (2). See also I.R.C. § 45K(d)(5) noting: “The term
‘barrel-of-oil equivalent’ with respect to any fuel means that amount of such fuel
which has a Btu content of 5.8 million . . . .”
178. Id. at § 45K(c)(1).
179. Id. at § 45Q(a)(2).
180. Id. at § 45Q(a)(2)(A), (B).
181. I.R.C. § 45Q(d)(4). “The term ‘qualified enhanced oil or natural gas
recovery project’ has the meaning given the term ‘qualified enhanced oil recovery
project’ by § 43 (c)(2), by substituting ‘crude oil or natural gas’ for ‘crude oil’ in
subparagraph (A)(i) thereof.”
182. Id. at § 907(a), (b).
183. Id. at § 907(b)(1)(A). “[F]oreign oil gas extraction incomes” and (B)
“[F]oreign oil related incomes.”
184. Pirog reported that the elimination of these credits could increase annual tax
revenues by up to $11 billion over the tax decade of FY2014 to FY2023. PIROG,
supra note 172, at 9. See also Daniel J. Weiss & Miranda Peterson, With Only $93
Billion in Profits, the Big Five Oil Companies Demand to Keep Tax Breaks,
ENERGY & ENVIRO., CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS, (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www
.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2014/02/10/83879/with-only-93-billion-inprofits-the-big-five-oil-companies-demand-to-keep-tax-breaks/, archived at http:
//perma.cc/3UNB-Q483.
185. I.R.C. § 167(h)(1) allows for a 24-month recovery of the costs and I.R.C. §
167(h)(5) allows certain major integrated oil companies seven years to recover the
costs.
186. Kroll et al., supra note 170.
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IRC § 263(c) provides for the expensing of the intangible
drilling and development costs associated with the development
stage of an oil and gas project; this deduction allowance accelerates
cost recovery on the investment.187 It is estimated that this
allowance returns $700 million to $3.5 billion a year to petroleum
producers.188
IRC § 193 Tertiary Injectants enables the same-year cost recovery
of the chemicals used to increase and facilitate production.189 The
injectants must be injectants that are not recoverable hydrocarbons.190
The costs of this program are relatively small, estimated at $50
million over the five-year period beginning in 2013.191
IRC § 199 allows a specific deduction of up to nine percent of the
costs or incomes resulting from domestic production activities.192
While the deduction is available to many industries beyond oil and
gas, there are specific provisions for oil and gas producers that reduce
the deduction by three percent.193 The production, refining,
processing, transportation, or distribution of oil, gas, or any primary
product is included as domestic production.194 It is estimated that this
allowance returns $574 million to $1.4 billion a year to petroleum
producers.195
2. Tax Incentives for Alternative Energy Production
While the IRC provides a larger economic boost to the fossil fuel
industry, it also provides incentives for renewable energy programs;
the expected costs of support for renewable energy innovations is
187. This treatment is in contrast to the regular requirement to capitalize certain
investments. Contrast I.R.C. § 263(a) and (c); “(a) General rule: No deduction shall
be allowed for [a]ny amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent
improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate[;]”
and “(c) . . . regulations shall be prescribed by the Secretary . . . which granted the
option to deduct as expenses intangible drilling and development costs in the case of
oil and gas wells . . . .”
188. Kroll et al., supra note 170. Pirog reported a potential increase in tax
revenues of $1 billion a year from the repeal of this provision. PIROG, supra note
172, at 4. In 2013, the deduction was seen as a $1.3 billion cost to tax revenues.
SHERLOCK, supra note 169, at 8.
189. I.R.C. § 193(a).
190. Id. at § 193(b)(1) and (2).
191. SHERLOCK, supra note 169, at 14.
192. I.R.C. § 199(a)(1).
193. Id. at § 199(c)(4)(A) and (d)(9).
194. Id. at § 199(d)(9)(B).
195. Kroll et al., supra note 170. See also Weiss & Peterson, supra note 184.
Pirog reported that the elimination of this allowance for domestic oil and gas
producers could increase annual tax revenues by up to $17.4 billion over the tax
decade of FY2014 to FY2024. PIROG, supra note 172, at 5.
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estimated at $39.5 billion for the five year period beginning in
2013.196 The dominant focus within renewable energy incentives is
on the development of technologies to produce electricity from
renewable resources and the development of renewable transportation
fuels.197
IRC § 40 and IRC § 40A provide tax credits for producers of
alternative liquid fuels such as alcohol-based fuels,198 bio-diesels, and
renewable diesel fuels.199 Bio-diesel,200 agri-diesel,201 and renewable
diesel producers can receive $1 per gallon of produced fuels.202 The
cost of this program of tax credits is estimated to be $2.2 billion a
year, with the alcohol component being comparatively small at $200
million annually.203
IRC § 45 enables a renewable electricity production credit to be
earned by such producers; it returns $0.015 per kilowatt-hour
produced.204 The qualified resources are enumerated: wind, closedloop biomass, open-loop biomass, geothermal energy, solar energy,
small irrigation power, municipal solid waste, qualified hydropower
production, and marine and hydrokinetic renewable energy.205 It is
estimated that this allowance could return $1.7 billion a year to
producers of electricity from renewable resources.206
IRC § 45J enables an advanced nuclear power facility production
credit; it returns $0.015 per kilowatt-hour produced by such
196. SHERLOCK, supra note 169, at 14.
197. Id. at 15.
198. I.R.C. § 40(b)(2)(A). “The alcohol credit of any taxpayer for any taxable
year is 60 cents for each gallon of alcohol which is not in a mixture with gasoline or
a special fuel . . . .”
199. Id. at § 40A(b)(1)(A). “The biodiesel mixture credit of any taxpayer for any
taxable year is $1.00 for each gallon of biodiesel used by the taxpayer in the
production of a qualified biodiesel mixture.” See also SHERLOCK, supra note 169, at
11.
200. I.R.C. § 40A(d)(1). “The term ‘biodiesel’ means the monoalkyl esters of
long chain fatty acids derived from plant or animal matter which meet—(A) the
registration requirements for fuels and fuel additives established by the
Environmental Protection Agency under section 211 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C.
7545), and (B) the requirements of the American Society of Testing and Materials
D6751.”
201. Id. at § 40A(d)(2). “The term ‘agri-biodiesel’ means biodiesel derived
solely from virgin oils, including esters derived from virgin vegetable oils from corn,
soybeans, sunflower seeds, cottonseeds, canola, crambe, rapeseeds, safflowers,
flaxseeds, rice bran, mustard seeds, and camelina and from animal fats.”
202. SHERLOCK, supra note 169, at 11.
203. Id. See also MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31953,
ENERGY TAX INCENTIVES: MEASURING VALUE ACROSS DIFFERENT TYPES OF
ENERGY RESOURCES 7 (2012).
204. I.R.C. § 45(a)(1) and (2).
205. Id. at § 45(c)(1).
206. SHERLOCK, supra note 169, at 9.
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facilities.207 The dates of the design and intent to construct are key
determinants of qualifying as an advanced nuclear power facility.208
IRC § 45Q(a)(1) provides tax credits for CCS facilities that are
not affiliated with oil and gas production activities.209 The carbon
dioxide sequestration credit is $20 per metric ton of qualified carbon
dioxide, which is captured by the taxpayer at a qualified facility and
disposed of by the taxpayer in secure geological storage.210
IRC § 48 Energy Credits, or investment tax credits (ITC), are
available to investments in energy production that utilize geothermal
sources, micro-turbine sources, or combined heat and power
solutions. The ITC may be up to ten percent of the investment in the
energy project.211 The value of the credit program to investors has
been estimated at $500 million annually.212
IRC § 25D provides a 30% tax credit for the purchases and
installations of a variety home-based solar and wind power
systems.213 The value of those credits has been estimated to be close
to $900 million a year.214
The impacts of tax code incentives for renewable energy might
best be perceived from an “effective tax rate” (ETR) perspective
instead of a bulk dollar perspective. An ETR is the tax rate as
experienced after the various incentives have been included within
the final tax calculation. Renewable energy projects show
stunningly low ETR. Producers of electricity from solar thermal
projects benefit from an ETR of -244.7 and wind projects benefit
from their ETR of -163.8;215 the minus sign denotes an effective net
tax payment to the producers from the government. Nuclear power
producers also benefit from an ETR of -99.5,216 effectively reducing
their tax incidence to incidental levels. Oil and gas producers range
in ETR; integrated companies face an ETR of 15.2 while nonintegrated operations benefit from an ETR of -13.5.217 Producers of
electricity from natural gas pay the highest ETR of 34.4.218 Thus, it
207. I.R.C. § 45J(a).
208. Id. at § 45J(d)(2). “[T]he term ‘advanced nuclear facility’ means any
nuclear facility the reactor design for which is approved after December 31, 1993,
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (and such design or a substantially similar
design of comparable capacity was not approved on or before such date).”
209. Id. at § 45Q(a)(1).
210. Id. at § 45Q(a)(1)(A) and (B).
211. SHERLOCK, supra at note 169, at 10.
212. Id. See also SHERLOCK, supra note 204, at 7.
213. I.R.C. § 25D. See also SHERLOCK, supra note 203 at 10–11.
214. SHERLOCK, supra note 169, at 10.
215. SHERLOCK, supra note 203, at 22.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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could be argued that renewable energy projects face more favorable
net ETR under the tax code.
IV. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAWS DRIVE COMPETITION IN THE
MARKETPLACE
The global trading system, as exemplified by the WTO, works to
secure the free trade of goods and services without discriminatory
tariffs or barriers. The WTO is not the only such effort, as there are
many regional trade zones that either provide broad economic
alignments, such as the EU, or provide zones of expedited free trade,
such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and
the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) zone. These
organizations strive to provide protection to equal terms of trade and
open markets with limited exceptions to protect certain national
interests.
To the extent that energy resources, their products, and the
services that sustain their use are covered by the WTO and its
agreements, and similarly by other free trade groups, those energy
products and services are likely to benefit from the application of the
free trade regimes established by such organizations. As such, the
various existing energy products, both fossil fuel and renewables,
would benefit from free trade and removal of restraints and
discriminations to their flow in the global marketplace. Without
other environmental trade agreements to the contrary, this would
enable various energy products and services to compete with each
other directly on energy content and price structures, fostering
additional competition in the energy sector.
A. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
The GATT219 provides a legal framework for the WTO’s efforts
to reduce barriers to trade and the elimination of discriminatory
treatment in international commerce.220
1. The GATT Attempts to Achieve the Free Flow and Free
Trade of Goods.
The GATT begins by requiring each contracting party to provide
“most favored nation” treatment to all other contracting parties;221 this
219. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
220. Id. at Preamble.
221. Id. at pt. I, art. I.
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treatment enables each contracting party to set its own unique custom
or tariff measures while simultaneously enabling all other parties to
receive as-good-as terms. Each contracting party is also required to
maintain “schedules of concessions” of their measures.222 Domestic
taxes and similar levies are likewise required to offer no benefit to
domestic production nor discrimination against foreign production.223
Freedom of transit, of several varieties, is guaranteed under the
GATT.224
No quantitative prohibitions or restrictions may be imposed on the
importation of goods between contracting parties, other than by
duties, taxes, and the like.225 If a quantitative prohibition or restriction
is imposed, then the GATT requires those measures to be equally
applied against all third parties.226 The GATT prohibits domestic
regulations of contracting parties from requiring domestic production
content, and prohibits domestic regulations from setting guidelines for
foreign production content.227
Temporary shocks to the free trade system can be accommodated
under the GATT. Subsidies to increase exports or reduce imports can
be permitted under the GATT, but not without a substantial review of
the circumstances.228 Dumping of products below comparable prices
is prohibited and may be responded to by assessment of levies to
“correct” for the market price of the dumped goods.229 Similarly,
when unforeseen developments place domestic products at risk of
serious injury, then contracting parties may take certain liberties with
their GATT obligations with regard to their schedule of
concessions.230
2. The GATT Particularly Promotes Exports of Fossil Fuels
from Developing Parties.
The GATT recognizes that the attainment of its trade policy goals
would be best achieved coincident with the progressive development
222. Id. at art. II.
223. Id. at pt. II, art. III, sec. 1 and 2. E.g., imposition of carbon taxes would be
allowed so long as they did not provide for discriminatory effects, among other
issues.
224. Id. at art. V.
225. GATT, art. XI, sec. 1.
226. Id. at art. XIII, sec. 1.
227. Id. art. III, sec. 5–7.
228. Id. art. XVI.
229. Id. art. VI, sec. 1-2. Valuation of products is set out in art. VII, wherein it
is set at the “actual value;” actual value is a defined term meaning the value of
“like merchandise . . . sold or offered for sale in the ordinary course of trade under
fully competitive conditions.”
230. Id. art. XIX, sec. 1(a).
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of those contracting parties whose economies can only support low
standards of living and are in early stages of development.231 Such
developing contracting parties may apply flexibility to their tariff
structures to support a nascent industry, or they may apply
quantitative measures to similarly support development.232
Contracting parties that qualify as both “low standards of living”
and “in early stages of development” shall be free to temporarily
deviate from the GATT’s terms under specific requirements.233 For
those countries that depend heavily on exports of a small number of
primary commodities234 such as oil, when those exports are seriously
reduced, then those contracting parties may seek Consultation for
sympathetic consideration for flexibility under the GATT
requirements.235
In order to help less-developed contracting parties develop their
economies and improve their standards of living, the GATT supports
the rapid and sustained expansion of those parties’ export earnings.236
Since most of those parties rely heavily on the export of primary
products such as crude oil or natural gas,237 the GATT supports
recognition of the need to provide favorable and acceptable access to
world markets “in the largest possible measure.”238 Stable, equitable,
and remunerative prices are to be achieved by the WTO’s policies and
the efforts of contracting parties to support these primary products
through expanding their demand on the world market and increasing
231. GATT, art. XVIII, sec. 1. See also GATT Annex I, Ad. art. XVIII, wherein
it is clarified that the process of market correction to cure overreliance on primary
production can also merit an economy as “in the early stages of development.”
232. Id. at pt. II, art. XVIII, sec. 2.
233. Id. at sec. 4(a) (referencing Sections A, B, and C of art. XVIII). Many
energy exporting nations are arguably such states, such as Chad.
234. Primary products include fuels and mining products, coal, crude oil, and
natural gas. See U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, STANDARD INTERNATIONAL
TRADE CLASSISFICATION, REVISION 4, at sec. 2, divs. 27–28, sec. 3, divs. 32–34, sec.
6, div. 68, U.N. DOC. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.M/34/REV.4, U.N. Sales No. E.06.XVII
.10 (2006), available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/SeriesM/SeriesM
_34rev4e.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2AJL-SC55. See also World Trade
Organization, INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 2011, 188–90 (2011) [hereinafter
WTO].
235. GATT, pt. II, art. XVIII, sec. 5, with reference to art. 22.
236. Id. at pt. IV, art. XXXVI, sec. 1 and 2.
237. Crude oil, natural gas, and coal are considered primary products. WTO,
supra note 238, at 190. See also U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Standard
International Trade Classisfication, Revision 4, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER
.M/34/Rev.4, U.N. Sales No. E.06.XVII.10 (2006), available at http://unstats.un.org
/unsd/publication/SeriesM/SeriesM_34rev4e.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2AJLSC55 (crude oil is listed at Division 33, natural gas at Division 34, and coal at
Division 32).
238. GATT, pt. IV, art. XXXVI, sec. 4.
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the level of trade in these primary resources.239 Thus, the GATT
recognizes an obligation to support the sustained and competitive
export of primary products, including fossil fuels, for the social and
welfare needs of its lesser-developed contracting parties.
However, this support of primary product exports is to be
accompanied with ancillary developments in industrial
diversification;240 this might be in converting primary products to
secondary products or the development of industry unrelated to the
primary products. Thus, Section 5 could be satisfied in a variety of
ways related to energy products; for instance, (i) crude oil sales
could be diversified to include refinery products; (ii) fossil fuel
revenues could be used to acquire renewable energy technology
and sources; or (iii) separate sources of financing could support
acquisition of alternative energy sources. In all manners, the path
of diversification could foreseeably result in additional energy
products, potentially requiring increased levels of domestic
primary production to support the diversified export product lines.
To further support the lesser-developed contracting parties, the
developed parties under the GATT agree to certain “commitments,”
or obligations.241 Key among these obligations is to refrain from the
introduction of non-tariff import barriers that might frustrate the
export of primary products targeted in the above discussions.242
Another obligation is to improve the access to world markets for
those primary products of lesser-developed parties.243 Developed
parties are obligated to undertake action to achieve international
arrangements to facilitate such results if necessary; parties are
encouraged to collaborate to achieve concrete measures to support
long-run profitable export of those primary products.244
While the original intent of these terms may not have foreseen
the needs of climate change mitigation efforts, it appears that the
developed countries do bear commitments to protect those critical
primary product exports or, under Article XXXVI, to financially
support the replacement of those revenues through some means of
industrial diversification.
While certain WTO parties are both developed and rich in fossil
fuel resources,245 many countries rich in such assets remain lesserdeveloped contracting parties to the GATT. To the extent that those
countries need the revenues from the exports of their natural
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id.
Id. at sec. 5.
Id. at art. XXXVII.
Id. at sec. 1(b).
Id. at art. XXXVIII, sec. 2(a).
GATT, sec. 2(a) and (c).
E.g., Norway and the United States.
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resources, the developed parties of the WTO have undertaken
obligations to not only allow, but to foster and encourage the
development of such fossil fuel exports into the global markets. Given
the number of lesser-developed states requiring such fossil fuel export
revenues and the broader challenges of advancing their economies
and standards of living, it is foreseeable that the WTO will need to
continue the sustained support of expanding and ensuring the
profitability of fossil fuel exports. Given those requirements, it is also
reasonably foreseeable that the WTO would continue to ensure that
larger supplies of fossil fuels remain on the market and that such
products would be priced to remain sustainably competitive.
3. Exceptions for Other Situations
Article XX allows for the imposition of certain critical or
necessary measures, so long as the measures themselves are not
arbitrary or unjustifiable forms of trade restrictions or trade
discrimination.246 There are several measures that might apply to the
export of primary products and to the energy industries.
First, if the imposed measure is necessary for the protection of
human, animal, or plant life, then such a measure would not be
prevented by the GATT.247 Given the multitude of concerns about the
potential impacts of climate change, it would be reasonable for some
parties to present arguments that they need to implement certain
measures to mitigate the overall hazards to human life, animal life,
and plant life within their jurisdictions. However, while such
measures might be applied internally, it appears that no power exists
under the GATT to impose such measures on other contracting
parties; thus, if one party was concerned about the impact of fossil
fuel consumption, it might be able to reduce fossil fuel consumption
within its own jurisdiction but have no ability to impose a similar
measure on a third contracting party. So, if that third party wanted to
produce and export fossil fuel primary products or derivative
products, then the GATT would not avail a power to limit that party’s
choice of production; indeed, as discussed,248 the GATT might
require the first party to support that export of fossil fuel if the first
party was developed and the exporting party was a lesser-developed
party.
Second, if the measures are necessary to accommodate
compliance with other treaties or regulations then the measures would
246. GATT, pt. II, art. XX.
247. Id. at sec. (b).
248. See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussion on GATT’s role to support development
of lesser-developed primary product exporting parties).
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not be prevented by the GATT, so long as those requirements and
measures are not otherwise inconsistent with the requirements of the
GATT.249 Similar to the key logic in the above paragraph, this section
would allow parties to enable their own compliance with climate
change agreements or energy market agreements, but it would not
enable them to expand those measures onto other unwilling parties
under the GATT. This section might allow multiple parties to engage
in the development and construction of coordinated climate change
measures and enable their own reduction of carbon emissions, but
again, such measures would first need to be not inconsistent with the
goals of the GATT, and second be limited to those volitionally so
motivated and not beyond. Given that the GATT requires support of
primary product exports from developing parties, climate change
management efforts would need to accommodate those needs as well.
Indeed, the UNFCCC does call for such assistance and the
Technology Mechanism is an instance of such assistance,250 but the
broader requirement to improve the economic development and to
improve the standard of living for those lesser-developed parties
remains; it is unclear if the UNFCCC measures will result in such
changes.251
The third and fourth measures are closely related. Third, if the
measures are related to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources, then such measures would be allowed so long as they are
implemented alongside similar restrictions on domestic production or
consumption.252 Fourth, if a measure is undertaken to comply with
any intergovernmental commodity agreement and is not otherwise
inconsistent with the requirements of the GATT, then such a measure
would be allowed.253 This is interesting in that a variety of such
agreements, such as the ECT and OEPC, do exist for fossil fuel type
commodities. OPEC and the ECT clearly call for larger supplies of
fossil fuels at sustainable and competitive prices, goals that appear
very much in line with the broader goals of the GATT. Also, while
commodity exporters might be prevented from dumping oil products
on other contacting parties,254 the GATT does not appear to prevent

249. GATT, pt. II, art. XX, sec. (d).
250. See supra Part I for discussion on UNFCCC. See also supra Part I.B. for
discussion on technology transfer.
251. Arguably, this is the crux of OPEC’s concerns on global poverty and not
climate change as the premier global environmental crisis. See supra Part II.B.3
for discussion on OPEC’s concern on global poverty.
252. GATT, pt. II, art. XX, sec. (g).
253. Id. at pt. II, art. XX, sec. (h).
254. Id. at pt. I, art. VI.

470

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. 3

them from self-constraining their own domestic production.255
Broadly speaking, it is foreseeable that intergovernmental agreements
on commodities, particularly commodities drawn from primary
products, would be designed to increase the level of trade and export
parties’ revenues; thus, it is foreseeable that Article XX(h) may lead
to higher levels of fossil fuel production, not less.
Ergo, while the GATT itself enables parties to undertake certain
measures as general exceptions to the broader requirement of the
GATT’s obligations, it appears that on balance such exceptions would
do little to reduce fossil fuel production, sans volitional agreements
by the relevant parties, and foreseeably its Article XX rules could lead
to increased levels of such production.
B. General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
Energy is not only physical products, energy as an industry also
includes a range of service products. This section examines the
character of the General Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS)
for its influence on international and trans-boundary trade of energy
products and services.
The GATS’s rules apply to services rendered by a party in one
Member to a customer in another Member.256 It supports the efforts
of Members to create and enter into agreements of economic
integration; such economic integration agreements both provide
substantial sectorial coverage and provide for the absence or
elimination of trade discrimination.257
Domestic regulation of service industries must be reasonable,
objective, and impartial.258 Technical standards or regulations must
be based on objective and transparent criteria,259 not be more
burdensome than necessary,260 and for licensing procedures, not be
themselves a restriction on trade.261 Also, the GATS provides for the
recognition that certain business practices of service suppliers may

255. On the other hand, to the extent that such Art. XX(g) “conservation efforts”
measures were to be adverse to the economic development of those lesser-developed
parties, then the GATT might actually require the developed parties to reach out in
collaboration to resolve the situation in a manner that led to greater exports and to
more sustainable prices. See GATT, pt. IV, art. XXXVI.
256. GATTS, pt. I, art. I, secs. 1 and 2.
257. Id. at pt. II, art. V, sec. 1.
258. Id. at pt. II, art. VI, sec. 1.
259. Id. at pt. II, art. VI, sec. 4(a).
260. Id. at pt. II, art. VI, sec. 4(b).
261. Id. at pt. II, art. VI, sec. 4(c).
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also restrain competition which results in restrictions in trade of
services.262
The Members are obligated to support the growth and
development of the domestic service capacity of developing
Members.263 Key among these obligations are the requirements to
liberalize market access and to liberalize the modes of supply of
export interest to the developing Members.264 Due to the special
economic situations, special priority is to be given to the support of
least-developed Members.265 Their development, trade, and financial
needs are to be taken account of in the setting of their obligations
within the GATS.266 When developing Members are parties to
agreements on economic integration, flexibility shall be allowed to
them to support their development.267
Article XIV “Security Exceptions” provides for Members to
potentially take certain actions to support their obligations under the
United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace
and security;268 further, Members may take measures to provision a
military establishment or to act in time of war or for emergencies in
international relations.269 Arguendo, the impacts of climate change
are expected to affect international peace and security, and most
Members of the GATS are signatories to the UNFCCC and its
subsequent accords, thus Members of the GATS might reasonably
be allowed to deviate from the GATS’s rules to ameliorate
anthropogenic climate change. Additionally, militaries are becoming
increasingly responsive to imminent climate change impacts as part
of their near-term planning,270 and as such, such measures might be
well permitted under the GATS.
Nothing within the GATS prevents Members from adopting
domestic measures to address the causes of anthropogenic climate
change, but it would limit the manner in which said measures were
designed; the measures must remain in support of the goals of the
GATS to enable free trade in services free from trade
discrimination.

262. GATTS, pt. II, art. IX, sec. 1.
263. Id. at pt. II, art. IV, secs. 1(a), (b), and (c).
264. Id. at pt. II, art. IV, sec. 1(c).
265. Id. at pt. II, art. IV, sec. 3.
266. Id.
267. Id. at pt. II, art. IV, art. 5, sec. 3(a).
268. GATS, pt. II, art. XIV bis, sec. 1(c).
269. Id. at pt. II, art. XIV bis, secs. 1(b)(i) and (iii).
270. See supra Part III.B. for discussion on the U.S. DoD’s climate change
planning.
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V. GREEN PARADOX RESULTS FROM CORNUCOPIA OF ENERGY
INNOVATIONS
A. Putting the Parts Together
There are several conclusions to be drawn from the above
discussions. First, legal measures intended to alleviate causes of
anthropogenic climate change are providing incentives to stimulate
innovation and production of energy from new and renewable energy
sources. It is reasonable to expect at least some progress on this front,
and if so, then energy supplies will increase. Anecdotal evidence
supports the hope that green energy might soon be abundant and
affordable.271
Second, international legal conventions exist that support the
sustained production and marketing of fossil fuels. As a part of their
efforts, they also provide incentives for innovations to sustain, extend,
and expand the current levels of hydrocarbon production. As seen in
the recent shale (“frack”) oil developments, and in potential offshore
methane hydrates developments, it is reasonably foreseeable that
these efforts will result in additional and sustained hydrocarbon
energy supplies; again, anecdotal evidence reinforces this
conclusion.272
Third, nations are pursuing energy security targets, as modern
industrial nations are dependent on energy sources to sustain the
271. Researchers at Stanford University and University of California at Davis
have provided an excellent review of the “feasibility of providing worldwide energy
for all purposes” from wind power, solar power, and water power sources by 2030.
See Mark Z. Jacobson & Mark A. Delucchi, Providing All Global Energy with
Wind, Water, and Solar Power, Part I: Technologies, Energy Resources, Quantities
and Areas of Infrastructure, and Materials, 39 ENERGY POLICY 1154 (2011). See
also Mark A. Delucchi & Mark Z. Jacobson, Providing All Global Energy with
Wind, Water, and Solar Power, Part II: Reliability, System and Transmission Costs,
and Policies, 39 ENERGY POLICY 1170 (2011).
272. Shale oil continues to play a substantial role in the reassessment of potential
fossil fuel reserves. The largest shale oil deposit in the United States is the Green
River Formation near Wyoming, Colorado and Utah. It is estimated to contain a very
large volume of recoverable petroleum. As a Rand Corporation study stated, “the
midpoint in our estimate range [for the Green River Formation], 800 billion barrels,
is more than triple the proven oil reserves of Saudi Arabia. Present U.S. demand for
petroleum products is about 20 million barrels per day. If oil shale could be used to
meet a quarter of that demand, 800 billion barrels of recoverable resources would
last for more than 400 years.” JAMES T. BARTIS, ET AL., OIL SHALE DEVELOPMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES: PROSPECTS AND POLICY ISSUES ix (2005). Similarly, the
potential volumes of offshore methane hydrates range nearly 100 fold that of current
conventional natural gas reserves. See Roy Andrew Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus:
Planning Ahead for the Commercial Development of Offshore Methane Hydrates 15
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 4, 16–25, 56–58 (2015).

2015]

GORED BY A CORNUCOPIA

473

scale of their economies. For example, the United States is pursuing
innovation on all fronts: renewables, hydrocarbons, and nuclear
energy. Very large subsidies and other incentives are provided to
attain these goals; again, it is reasonably foreseeable that energy
security needs will result in greater energy supplies. Anecdotal
reports support that progress is being made to further develop
energy supplies for security.273
Fourth, most of the world’s economies are connected via
international trade law conventions that support free trade, trade
without unfair tariffs, and discrimination-free trade. Thus, it would
be very difficult to control the flow of energy products for
contracting parties of those conventions. Further, the WTO has
certain obligations to support the export of primary products and to
ensure the growth of economic development and raise the standard
of living for its contracting parties, especially its lesser-developed
members. As such, these legal conventions will advance the
competitive markets of energy products and provide the economic
mechanisms that enable market forces to regulate market results.
Clearly, the foreseeable result is the possibility that energy
supplies will be expanded on a variety of fronts and that these
energy products will face a fairly competitive marketplace. Given
the nature of the market and the demand for energy from a growing
and developing population, it is likely that more energy will be
consumed; ergo, there is a risk that higher levels of fossil fuels will
also be consumed.
1. International Energy Laws are Driving a Cornucopia of
Energy Innovations
The above studies have shown that three major clusters of energy
law or energy conventions provide incentives for energy innovations.
Those energy innovations include all areas of energy sources: fossil
fuels, renewable fuels, and others such as nuclear fuel. Those
273. For the official perspective on the “Great Green Fleet” at the core of the
USN’s climate change policies and its progress to achieve a fleet running on new
and renewable fuels, see Energy, Environment and Climate Change, U.S. NAVY,
http://greenfleet.dodlive.mil/energy/great-green-fleet/, archived at http://perma.cc
/7QD4-65HP (last visited Jan. 9, 2015). Prior to its full-time deployment set to begin
in 2016, the Great Green Fleet participated in the 2012 Rim of the Pacific
(RIMPAC) offshore naval exercise, “the world’s largest international maritime
exercise.” Id. For a report from progressive media on the recent developments,
including coverage of that debut of the fleet in 2012, see Julia Whitty, My HeartStopping Ride Aboard the Navy's Great Green Fleet -- With Washington Frozen
Solid on Climate, the Navy is Breaking the Ice, MOTHER JONES, (Mar./Apr., 2013),
http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2013/02/navy-climate-change-greatgreen-fleet, archived at http://perma.cc/7JZ8-AZ3R.
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measures are all aimed at increasing the potential amount of energy
supply from targeted energy sources and ensuring that the resultant
energy supplies are market competitive with other existing or
emerging energy supplies.
The UNFCCC provided a framework of strategies to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions by multiple approaches.274 Energy
efficiency was called for; however, energy efficiency leaves surplus
energy on the market if not consumed, and the Jevons Paradox has
long raised doubts of whether energy efficiency ever reduced
consumption.275 Innovations in new and renewable energy sources
were called for. With success, the world might soon have abundant
supplies of green energy. But those energy products will be fungible
and competitive with existing electrical supplies and transportation
fuels; global competitive energy supplies will be increased. The
prevention of methane emissions and the capture of carbon in sinks
and reservoirs is laudable, but the presence of carbon sinks might
serve to justify arguments that fossil fuels can be consumed safely.
Many sinks and reservoirs, such as forests and wetlands, would not
be directly connected to the energy user and would remain
somewhat of a public good. Thus, many might claim to use what
might only sustain a few in carbon absorption and storage.
The role of the ECT and of OPEC to promote hydrocarbon
resources is clearly laid out.276 Both organizations have contracting
parties committed to the sustained development, production, and
marketing of their petroleum and natural gas assets. They endeavor
to ensure that their products remain price competitive with
substitutable goods and that their industries continue to provide
reasonable returns on capital investment. They further seek to
support their products in international trade. As such, it is reasonable
to expect that these states will endeavor to provide continued and
expanded levels of energy supplies from fossil resources.
Energy security laws are designed to provide secure sources of
energy in a world of instability; it is in the nature of such provisional
planning to plan for redundancy—in short to plan and provide for
surplus energy supply capacity. The United States has multiple
strategies that each support divergent energy sourcing options. The
DOE is charged with energy innovation and reliability and provides
programmatic incentives to achieve those goals.277 The DOD has
274. See supra Part I.
275. For an in-depth review of the Jevons Paradox and its nexus with climate
change concerns, see JOHN M. POLIMENI, KOZO MAYUMI, MARIO GIAMPIETRO, &
BLAKE ALCOTT, THE MYTH OF RESOURCE EFFICIENCY (Earthscan, London, 2009)
(previously, THE JEVONS PARADOX AND THE MYTH OF RESOURCE EFFICIENCY).
276. See supra Part II.
277. See supra Part III.A.
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distinguishable energy security needs and operates primarily from
the Defense Production Act; still, the DOD remains committed to a
variety of energy innovation projects.278 The United States’ broader
energy agenda, as enunciated by Congress through the tax code,
provides a hodgepodge of economic incentives to petroleum energy
resources, new and renewable energy sources, and alternative
energy sources.279 Given the scale of the programs and incentives, it
is reasonable to expect that additional energy supplies could result.
The WTO’s particular support of primary products from lesserdeveloped parties is of additional note: that a body ostensibly aiming
for even and fair trade has taken concern to ensure that lesserdeveloped countries are able to export their primary products in a
manner that leads to their further economic development.280 As
petroleum is a key primary product for certain lesser developed
countries, in addition to being a primary export for certain countries,
the WTO system supports the growth of fossil fuels in a manner that
it likely would be unable to support new and renewable energy
supplies sans additional growth in the scope of the WTO.
Thus, the variety of energy laws reviewed demonstrates that
their policy goals are to increase levels of energy supplies available
to the global market and to ensure that those energy supplies are
affordable to consumers. Additionally, to the extent that the
consumption of most energy products is path-dependent on the
installed machine base, energy source alternative will remain
compatible to current electrical and transportation fuel norms of
production.281 Thus, if the goals of those legal measures are attained,
it is reasonably foreseeable that consumers would be presented with
increased levels of energy supplies, that those energy supplies will
be competitive goods in character and usage, and that the costs of
those energy products and services would likely be competitive with
one another.
2. International Trade Laws and Market Forces Could Result
in Higher Consumption
International trade regimes, as exemplified by the WTO, strive
to enable idealized conditions for trade: free transit of goods and
services, tariff free marketing, and the absence of market
discrimination. Commodities and services can freely enter into a
278. See supra Part III.B.
279. See supra Part III.C.
280. See supra Part IV.A.2.
281. This problem is most clearly revealed in the DOD’s green energy planning.
See supra Part III.B.
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variety of markets; indeed, the concept of a global market is
correlated with the success of the GATT parties to reach to such a
high percentage of the world’s states.
When all other things stay the same,282 additional quantities
of otherwise “competitive products”283 into a common market
should result in lower prices if the overall demand function also
remains unchanged.284 That lower price enables the market to
clear and to consume all of the products. In this case, the products
would be the whole mix of energy products, including fossil fuels
and renewable energy sources. If the market did clear all of the
energy products placed into it, that clearing would require the
purchase and expected consumption of the fossil fuel products;
such consumption would result in greenhouse gas emissions, as
the fossil fuels are combusted for energy release.
3. Higher Energy Consumption Could Lead to Increased
Greenhouse Gas Emissions
If only the legal measures that address the support and sustained
production and future remunerative nature of fossil fuel industries
are successful in their efforts, the world would likely encounter
increased quantities of hydrocarbon production, at least for the next
several decades, or potentially much longer.285
282. The economic modelling phrase of ceteris paribus is the targeted meaning
herein.
283. The economic parlance would be ‘similarly priced, highly substitutable
(or close substitutes) goods’ in lieu of ‘competitive goods.’
284. N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS, FIFTH EDITION
(South-Western, 2009), see Table 4, at 82. See also ROBERT H. FRANK,
MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR, EIGHTH EDITION, 37–41 (2010). In more formal
terms, see ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, & JERRY R. GREEN,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY (1995). The references here are to several popular
textbooks at the undergraduate and post-graduate level of economics courses. The
original concept(s) was pioneered by Alfred Marshall, who called it “scissors
analysis,” building on its previous discovery of “suppy and demand” theory by
Antoine Augustin Cournot.
285. While many might expect that hydrocarbons are running into short
supply, such is not the actual case. While arguments could be presented that the
costs to explore and develop crude oil assets are increasing, technology has
continued to develop, and certain costs of previously unproducible hydrocarbon
assets have come in recent range. The development of the shale oil industry,
colloquially refered to as “frack oil,” has dramatically reset the global markets in
crude oil. Another potential hydrocarbon resource, offshore methane hydrates,
were only recently the subject of pure research; however, Japanese researchers
demonstrated the production potential of those resources in 2013. For an indepth discussion on the centuries-long potential production profile of offshore
methane hydrates, see Partain, supra note 272.
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Increased consumption of those fossil fuels could result from
several scenarios. First, if the global population continues to increase
its standard of living,286 it will likely have higher demands for energy.
Second, if the world’s population continues to increase in size, and at
least maintains its current standard of living, then the additional
humans would require additional energy consumption. Third, if the
increased supplies were subject to traditional supply and demand
analysis, then even when no increases in the demand function were to
be observed, we would expect the prices of such fuels to drop until
they were all purchased.287 It is likely that standard of living will
continue to improve; it is likely that the world’s population will
continue to increase in count, and it is likely that prices will be
adjusted to ensure that the products are consumed.
Green energy innovations might not be sufficient to cure this
result. First, the creation and production of highly substitutable
energy sources, biofuels to replace conventional diesel, and solar
plants to replace coal power plants does not ensure the elimination
of fossil fuel consumption globally but does reduce the previous
consumption of those fuels, effectively rendering more fossil fuels
into the marketplace, i.e., avoiding the consumption of fossil fuels
effectively increases their supply for other consumers.
4. Gains in Efficiency Might Not Help
One might expect gains in energy efficiency to reduce overall
energy demand by technologically requiring less energy for each task,
as mandated by the UNFCCC.288 However, gains in energy efficiency
seldom result in lower levels of energy consumption. The UNFCCC
and related regulatory efforts encourage the promotion of energy
efficient technologies as a complement to encouraging renewable and
carbon-free energy sources.289 The basic concept is that if engines and
machines needed less energy, then less conventional fossil fuels
would be consumed.

286. A per se requirement of GATT and its contracting parties, see supra Part
IV.A.2.
287. This discussion is a gross simplification of the underlying economic
processes required, but it makes the effort to suggest that such results and events are
potential outcomes of current legal policies. It does not make an effort to prove or
extensively demonstrate any sense of specific likelihoods, but instead, it merely
posits that such scenrios might be feasible under current legal measures. To the
extent that they are potential future risks or hazards is sufficient for the present legal
analysis, no demonstration of proof or certainty is made herein.
288. See supra Part I.D.
289. Id.
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However, as Jevons first wrote nearly two centuries ago, energy
efficiency does not necessarily lead to a reduction in energy demand
and may well encourage increased energy demand.290 There are
several motivations for the traditional Jevons’ Paradox and the related
theories of “rebound effects.”291 While the economic phenomena
related to energy efficiency, Jevons’ Paradox, and the potential for
energy efficiency to increase energy could engage very lengthy
discussions,292 here is a quick sketch of several known related
phenomena:
i. The inelasticity of demand plays a key role; if a market
is able to absorb all of the energy provided to it at high
prices, then it will likely absorb greater supplies of energy
at lower prices.
ii. Efficiency gains can create a virtual increase in supply.
Considered from a unitized perspective:293 assume a task
originally took two parts of energy to complete and then
was made more efficient to require only one part of energy;
although the overall supply of energy was left unchanged,
the user of the machine will observe twice as much supply
vis-à-vis his operational needs. From the perspective of the
consumer, energy efficiency would make the supply of
energy appear increased.
iii. Reducing the necessary energy for any particular task
brings that task in range of more numerous populated but
290. “It is wholly a confusion of ideas to suppose that the economical use of fuel
is equivalent to a diminished consumption. The very contrary is the truth . . . .
[E]very . . . improvement of the engine, when effected, does but accelerate anew the
consumption of coal.” B. Alcott, Jevons' Paradox, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 9, 12
(2005).
291. The Khazzoom-Brookes Postulate states that improvements in energy
efficiency will increase energy consumption, ceteris paribus; the Postulate
specifically assumes fixed real energy prices. Lorna A. Greeninga, et al., Energy
efficiency and consumption — the rebound effect — a survey, 28 ENERGY POL. 389,
389 (2000). As the Postulate assumes no change in energy prices, the quantity
demanded necessarily reflects a new demand function for energy after the
achievement of energy efficiency. Greening, Greene, and Difiglio proposed a fourpart typology to separate the various mechanisms responsible for the effects
postulated by Khazzoom-Brookes. Id. at 390. They recognized the four mechanisms
as (i) direct rebound effects, (ii) secondary fuel usage effects, (iii) energy market
clearing mechanism effects, and (iv) transformational effects. Id. at 390. The authors
noted that their typology took the perspective that demand for energy cum fuels was
actually demand for a services product instead of a stock product, but for the
purposes of this comment, the nuance causes no significant difference.
292. See POLIMENI ET AL., supra note 275.
293. In economics literature this has been described as the rebound effect of
efficiency gains or as the backfire effect when policy goals of efficiency were to
enable budget maintenace or reduction.
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smaller energy budgets; energy efficiency puts more tasks in
range of more people.294 By enabling more people to
consume energy, it is possible that energy efficiency can
lead to additional economic activity and potentially
economic growth.295
Lower prices, increases in effective supply, and reduced scale of
energy needs per activity all could lead to sustained or higher
levels of energy consumption. Higher energy consumption could
lead to higher levels of greenhouse gas emissions.
CONCLUSION
BETTER CHOICES IN INNOVATION: THE STONE AGE DID NOT END
FOR LACK OF STONE296
Thus, in the present situation, without some form of change in
law and legal conventions, the world is faced with the imminent
possibility of increased greenhouse gas emissions as additional
energy supplies from both fossil fuels and new and renewable
energy sources respond to the incentive to innovate. There are
several ways to prevent this from happening.
First, the existing laws and legal conventions could be altered, and
such efforts are indeed in progress. The UN hopes for a major update
to the UNFCCC in 2015 at what is tentatively referred to as Paris
2015.297 However, it is already some three plus decades since the
international legal negotiations have been underway, starting with the
original talks that led to the UNFCCC itself. Major economies have
recently reduced their engagement with certain UNFCCC/Kyoto
targets, namely Australia and Canada. Another major economy, the
294. Assuming a Pareto distribution of income would suffice, that every level
of wealth has fewer members than the level immediately below it.
295. Also known as the Khazzoom–Brookes postulate. Khazzoom and Brookes,
separately and not as co-authors, provided a series of articles on the variations of this
concept, e.g. in 1978, 1980, 1982, 1987, and 1989. See Greeninga, et al., supra note
291, at 390.
296. “The Stone Age did not end for lack of stone, and the Oil Age will end long
before the world runs out of oil.” Often attributed to Sheikh Zaki Yamani. See The
End of The Oil Age, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 23, 2003), available at http://www
.economist.com/node/2155717, archived at http://perma.cc/6656-JDCR.
297. See 21st Conference of the Parties on Climate Change 2015, FRANCE
DIPLOMATIE (July 14, 2014), http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreignpolicy-1/climate-7436/2015-paris-climate-conference/, archived at http://perma.cc
/Q3MP-XEZG. See also Nick Nuttall, Negotiations Towards New Universal
Climate Agreement in 2015 Get Underway, UNFCCC (Mar. 14, 2014), http://unfccc
.int/files/press/press_releases_advisories/application/pdf/20141403_adpclose.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/V349-BW3E.
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United States, never joined in the Kyoto obligations.298 The world
remains without a united governance paradigm to achieve global
reductions in greenhouse gases.
Second, failing to achieve coordinated measures, governments
might attempt unilateral movements in domestic legal measures to
try to cobble together movement towards reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions. Such efforts have been undertaken, indeed much of
the green policies in place—certainly those of the United States—
have been undertaken from such a perspective. However, any effort
to provide incentives for green energy innovation sans other acts of
energy law coordination merely adds to global energy supplies as
discussed in this article299 and perhaps enables international carbon
leakage problems.300
Third, the general public could be persuaded to shift their
priorities and consumption preferences to create stronger market
demand for new and renewable energy products. An example of
such an effort is Al Gore’s slideshow cum book cum movie “An
Inconvenient Truth” and its worldwide media coverage, which
ensured that most people today are aware to some extent of the
issues.301 However, as green energy products are designed as close
substitutes for traditional energy products, their consumption might
merely relocate the consumption of fossil fuels to those consumers
either unaware or indifferent to the concerns of climate change, and
indeed, some might be prioritizing purchases of green energy
products; but nowhere are fossil fuels abandoned, nowhere are there
piles of fuel abandoned for use.302
298. At the time of writing in early November 2014, the Republican Party had
just gained control of Congress, both the House and the Senate. Such control will
likely limit the ability of the Obama Administration to overtly agree to the Paris
2015 agreements. For more on the limits of the American government to agree to
international climate accords, see Roy A. Partain & Sanghyun Lee, Article 20
Obligations under the KORUS FTA: The Deteriorating Environment for Climate
Change Legislation in the U.S., 24 AM. CONST. STUD. 441 (2013).
299. See supra Part V.
300. For a discussion on international carbon leakage, see Partain, Green
Paradox Spectre, supra note 3.
301. See AL GORE, AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH: THE PLANETARY EMERGENCY OF
GLOBAL WARMING AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2006). See also Kakutani’s
review of the book, Michiko Kakutani, Al Gore Revisits Global Warming, With
Passionate Warnings and Pictures, N.Y TIMES (May 23, 2006), http://www.nytimes
.com/2006/05/23/books/23kaku.html?pagewanted=all&_r=, archived at http://perma
.cc/8V6B-5BX5.
302. Perhaps recent price adjusts to oil, as of November 2014, reflect increased
supplies on the market, but still, the market appears to be clearing at the lower prices.
Details on the potential for oil prices to drop much further and remain above their
marginal costs of production are discussed in Partain, supra note 3, at Part III.
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So the best answer, barring global legal solutions at the 2015 Paris
convention, is hidden in that simple term of “perfect substitutes.” As
long as the green energy innovations are designed and implemented
as mere substitutes, they will not be effective at eliminating fossil
fuels from the marketplace, but will merely enable the continued
means of fuel and energy delivery. As long as the systems remain
similar, and as long as the relevant parties remain engaged in
maintaining and sustaining price competitiveness, the price of fossil
fuels will only face pressure to drop and thus become available for a
greater range of consumption options. Perfect substitutes lead to
competition, which can only be won on pricing, ceteris paribus.
Ergo, the innovations that are needed are either those innovations
that so transform the cost structure of new and renewable energy
sources as to make them consistently preferable to the substantial
totality of global customers, and those innovations that make the
character of new and renewable energy sources so sufficiently
superior that few would want to consume fossil fuels.
Instead of simply attempting to encourage all new and renewable
energy alternatives, energy policies that encourage innovation should
be focused on these two agendas: (i) dominant cost superiority and
(ii) dominant energy character. More energy, more readily accessed,
at lower costs, all while providing superior environmental and climate
protection.
Focusing on those policies that seek to squeeze fossil energy out
from one area will only encourage its consumption elsewhere.
Policies that attempt to deny the property rights of those that currently
own and derive their livelihoods from those resources is also ethically
and practically fraught with complexity and other hazards.303 New
technologies that accomplish the task better and at cheaper costs
displace the old technologies. The world needs those innovations in
energy; legal measures to suppress fossil fuels likely will not work.
Does the world need an era of fossil fuel prohibitionism? Or,
should the world seek better choices? The answer lies in better
choices. Selective innovation should be the goal of future energy
policies.

303. Sinn was very concerned with this topic of property rights and their impact
on accelerated depletion rates. See Partain, Green Paradox Spectre, supra note 3.

